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ABSTRACT
RICHARD JAMES EROSTRCM, JR. The Iirpact of Public Comment on
Regulatory Decision-Making: The Arsenic Standards.
(Under the direction of Dr. Michael A. Berry)
A method for the characterization and analysis of public oarment
on an EPA standard was proposed. The arsenic anissions standard was
chosen since it was the most canmented upon standard ever pranulgated
by the Agency. Uie proposed method worked well, as participating
groups were clearly defined and the intent of each of the groups was
reasonable in relation to their inferred environmental ideology. The
effectiveness of each of the major groups of conmenters was measured by
relating the number of ccraments submitted versus the number of changesnade.
Comments received on the risk assessment constituted 89 percent of
all ocmnents sutmitted, over half were sulxnitted by citizens not
belonging to any particular special interest group. Few changes were
made to the risk assessment as a result of the conments and the
effectiveness of the conments for all groups was less than two percent.
Conments submitted on the technical issues of the standard were
more successful in causing change to the proposed standard. The
effectiveness of each group varied widely, but the average
effectiveness was 20 times greater than for ocranents subnitted on risk
issues. Many changes dealt with the sutxnittal of new cost and
emissions data by the affected industries.
To allow for a discussion of the oonment process, Godschalk's
Exchange Model was altered and applied to the standard. The Exchange
Model indicated that the conment process was successful except in the
Agency's response to the public ocxnment. A group theory model was used
to analyze the the Agency's response to the comment. This nradel
indicated that the changes made to the proposed standards by the EPA
could not be explained rationally on the basis of public conment.
Other factors which influence EPA must be considered when explaining
the Agency's decisions in light of the public intent.
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SECTION I - INTRCOJCriCN/STUDy PURPOSE
Introduction
The chain of events which leads from public input to governmental
agency action is difficult to describe. The dynamics of an agency's
decisicn-making process is normally beyond casual observation (Berry,
1984). Yet, this link is the keystone whidi insures danocracy and
commands accountability in bureaucratic decisicn-making. It is a
bureaucracy's responsibility to consult with the general public and the
<
various interest groups. In environmental rule-making, citizen
involvement forces equity, efficiency and effectiveness, as both
corporate and enviroimental critics sed< to curb administrative
discreticai in two ways - through public participation and through
litigation.
Public corannent cxi proposed rules is one of the few nonadjudicatory
means for the expressicm of public opinicxi of a proposed agency
acticBi. Ccaigress has taken steps to insure adequate public involvement
in agency acticxis by demanding that certain measures be taken to
involve the public before a rule can be finalized. In its rule-making
procedures, EPA is required to actively solicit comment fran affected
publics, v^ch includes citizens, environiientalists, and the
potentially regulated industry.
Although the Agency is not compelled to make any decisicxis in
light of contents received, it is oonpelled, many times, to make very
difficult decisicxis en issues without legislative direction, well
defined policy, or regulatory precedent. It is in these controversial
issues, for exartple, the determination of acceptable risk, where
public conment becanes an inportant factor in the Agency decision-
making process. Since public input includes conments fran concerned
citizens, environmental groups and industrial supporters, the Agency is
often forced to view many sides of the inpacts which stem fron a
regulation. Each rule promulgated has a varying degree of public
involvement. As each environmental rule is pronulgated, EPA builds its
own precedents on these controversial issues with input from the
public.
Precedents are also created by the courts, as many of these rules
are adjudicated (more than 80 percent of all environmental standards
(Pederson,1975)). The courts establish precedents for the Agency to
follow based upon its decisions in light of the public will and the
technical data. The public will is determined on the basis of conment
received during the public conment period which accotpanies proposed
standards. However, citizen group suits have declined since 1975 due
to the willingness of officials to consult and accomidate citizen
demands rather than precipitate a lawsuit (Lake, 1982).
Public input, then, affects Agency action on current environmental
standards, but is also contributing to the policy-creating and
precedent-setting actions of EPA vrtiich will affect environmental
legislation for years to cone.
A good exanple of environmental rule-making which incorporates a
large amount of public involvement in critical issues can be found in
section 112 of the Clean Air Act. A section 112 regulation is camonly
called a "NESHAP", for national anissioi standards for hazardous air
gpllutants. The congressional intent was to use secticsi 112 NESHAP's
ff^^^^^'y^^ms^^^^
to deal effectively with air toxic "hot spots", and provide a catch-all
for non-criteria pollutants v^ich may pose a threat to the public
health. With concern for toxic air pollutants growing, more and more
environmental rules will be pranulgated under section 112 legislation.
Figure 1.1 illustrates section 112 and other coraiDnly used statutory
mechanisms for regulation under the Clean Mr Act.
As can be seen fran Figure 1.1, section 112 is quite different
from other sections of the Act in two major areas:
1. NESiaPS are standards which are to be developed without the
consideration of costs.
2. NESHAPS are standards which are to be developed with great
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FIGURE 1.1   SECTION 1 12 AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The current body of scientific knowledge is incapable of
demonstrating health effects from many air carcinogens with any degree
of certainty. It is this distinction which make section 112 so
inportant for the preservation of the public health, while at the same
time makes the standard-setting process so unwieldy.
Like the criteria pollutant regiilations, section 112 has technical
issues which must be resolved by EPA in areas such as the selection of
prominent emissions source categories. In addition, the best available
emissions control technologies must be determined by an analysis of
existing or tested pollution control devices. The major difference
between NESHAP's (section 112) regulation and NSPS's (section 111)
regulation is the basis for regulation. While cost/benefit analyses
were spelled out by Congress for use in section 111, the basis for
regulation in section 112 is risk assessment.
Unlike criteria pollutants, which have a definite measurable
health effect, health affects from toxic air pollutants are considered
permanent. The most canmon enc^xDint used for study is cancer. With
air carcinogens it is much more difficult to identify the exact
cause/effect relationship of pollutant source and health inpact. Given
the Agency's current approach to air carcinogens, the public is at sane
risk if exposed to any ambient concentration of carcinogen, however
small. The explanation for the acceptance of a non-threshold theory
for regulating air carcinogens can be found in the Agency's Air
Carcinogen Policy. Here, the Agency embraces an opinicxi put forward by
the National Academy of Sciences that:
"...when there is exposure to a material, we are not starting
at an origin of zero cancers. Nor are we starting at an
origin of zero carcinogenic agents in our environment. Thus,
it is likely that any carcinogenic agent added to the
environment will act by a particular mechanism on a particular
cell populaticai that is already being acted on by the same
mechanism to induce cancer." (EPA,1983)
The use of risk assessment as a basis for regulation incorporates,
to a great extent, the issues in which the Agency must seek public
involvement to aid in its decisioi-making. The very issues discussed
earlier to which the Agency does not have a set policy are issues which
are incorporated into section 112 regulation. These issues include
acceptable/non-acceptable risks, regulation in the absence of a clearly
established health endpoint, and the use of econcmics as a factor in a
health-based regulation. Without a clearly defined, politically
acceptable policy in these issues, EPA must satisfy the public will, or
face the consequences in court.
If a single section 112 regulation incorporates Agency use of
public involvement as an input into the regulation process, it would be
the national emissions standards for inorganic arsenic promulgated in
August, 1986. The purpose of the rule was to limit the amount of
inorganic arsenic emitted into the air fran various industrial
sources. Many of the sources which emitted the volatile metal were
located in urban areas of the country. While the Agency had seme
evidence which indicated that people living near the sources would
probably receive seme health benefits from the regiilation, there could
be no doubt that the econatiic inpacts resulting from the standard would
be significant to enployees and local economies.
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The focal point of the standard centered primarily en one arsenic
emissiCTi source, the ASAE«X)-Taooma copper smelter in Tacona,
Washingtcn. Almost aie fourth of all arsenic emitted to the atmosphere
nationwide was durtped fron this smelter with nearly two million
residents within 50 km (EPA, 1983). The smelter, v^ch ettployed 600
people and provided over $20 million in local revenues, was already cxi
the brink of closure as inexpensive copper from South America began to
make its way into the U.S. market (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1984). EPA
studies indicated that a strict arsenic emissiai regulation would most
certainly close the plant (EPA,1983).
On the other hand, several well documented epidemiological studies
had been published which showed that arsenic caused lung cancer in
exposed smelter workers, so BPA had a well documented health risk.
This risk was stated publicly t^ the Agency in the proposed regulation
and caused an immediate reactioi by the public and the affected
industry. Because of the urban locaticxi of the smelter, an enormous
amount of publicity occurred when the Agency announced its plans to
regulate arsenic emissions from copper smelters. This publicity was
soon turned by the Agency into public oorannent as EPA sought public
input from the conmunity to aid in its decision-making.
Study Purpose
Although it is clear that the Agency went to great lengths in the
solicitation of public conment on the arsenic standards, it is not
clear as to v*iether the ccrnments received actually served their
intended purpose. Currently, no adequate method of quantitatively
analyzing the public comment process exists. Hie purpose of this paper
is to suggest a method for analysis of the public ooitinent process
currently used in environmental rule-making. The standard chosen for
study is the inorganic arsenic standard pronulgated under section 112
of the Clean Air Act in August, 1986.
Since more than 2500 comments were received by the Agency, this
rule-making also provided a unique opportunity to measure a cross-
section of public oonment on an environmental standard with seme
measure of statistical validity. In characterizing the comment, the
following questions were be addressed:
• Who participated in establishing the standard?
• How intensively did the major groups (environmental,
business, industrial, university, local government,
etc..) participate?
• What was the collective "intent" of each of the groups
who participated in the process?
• How effective were each of the groups in ccaivincing EPA
to rethink its position and change the proposed arsenic
standard?
• Did EPA respond deferentially to oanments submitted
by any particular group?
The different modes of solicitating public opinion, hearings or
letters, are cotrpared and contrasted as to their effectiveness in
proipting Agency changes to the standard. Since the study will
indicate issues in which the Agency is more apt to respond, groups
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petiticning the Agency can focus their limited resources into areas in
vAiich the Agency is most likely to change its proposed position. By
analyzing the effectiveness of conments submitted by citizens as
compared to ooraments suhxnitted by groups which shared the same opinion
on an issue, the relative value of different groups v*iich claim to
represent affected publics can be assessed.
Without a clear identification of the public intent as indicated
by the comments submitted, there is little chance for a meaningful
detennination of the effectiveness of the public canment process. This
study develops a method for determining the intent of each of the
groups who participated in the process. By applying the intent of each
of the groups with their relative success in procnpting EPA to change
the proposed standard, a measurenent of the effectiveness of each group
is possible.
Finally, this study eitploys two models for analzing the results of
the quantitative analysis. Godshaulk's Exchange Model is used to
analyze the effectiveness of the comment period framework used by EPA.
In order to explain EPA response to the public canment, a group theory
model is used. By incorporating these methods for analysis and the
public participation models, the utility of the public ccnment period
for environmental regulaticai can be assessed.
SBCnCN II - LITERATURE REVIEW
Goals of Public Participation
The use of public iiput as a guide to government agency decision-
making has developed a body of theoretical approaches v*iich can be used
to understand the oonplex process. Ihere has probably been more ink
spilled by policy analysts discussing the merits of the public
involvement process than by concerned citizens using it. No analysis
of the effectiveness of the public involvement process is meaningful
without a presentaticxi of the intended goals of public participation in
agency actions. James Creighton, author of the U.S. Department of the
Interior's Public Involvement Manual, lists three goals for useful
public participation.
• CREDIBILITY - Public comment is incorporated into the
decision-making process to add to agency credibility
with groups having highly divergent viewpoints.
• IIENriFICATION CF PUBLIC CONCERNS - Public comnent
allows a government agency to receive input from
many different perspectives.
• DEVELCFING CONSENSUS - Comment serves to aid an agency in
developing a policy v*iich satisfies the most people.
(Creightai,1980)
It is this last point which is particularly inportant in
environmental rule-making, as the Environmental Protecticxi Ager^ seeks
the "path of least resistance" in its final regulaticais. However, the
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development of ccaisensus is rarely achieved by Agency alignment with
one view or another. Rather, the results of public oaiment most often
represent a oonpromise of oortpeting interests. Agency ccnprcmise was
recognized nearly half a century ago in an article which appeared in
the Journal of Public Policy. Here, the Agency's use of public cpinion
was described as a "fiction used to describe an amalgam of ccnpeting
interests v*iich is shaped and reshaped in the furnace of their
conflicts." (Fainsod, 1940). Ihis opinion points out the fact that the
public ccmment process can be described as a fierce battleground for
ootrpeting interests, rather than siirply a means for the agency to
collect the cpinion concerned citizens.
Realities of Public Involvement
Public input into agency actiai has been intensely criticized by
policy analysts and various citizen groups which seek a participatory
role in the development of governmental regulatiai. Seme of this
criticism is based upon oaimcxi misunderstandings of the realities of
the public involvatent process. Creighton (1980) listed seme comtioi
ctojections to the currently used public involvement process and the
realities of the process which serve to dispel ccmmon myths. Tliree of
the most frequent objections to public involvement are listed in
Table 2.1
The last objection listed in Table 2.1 identifies the increase in
time and cost to an agency as a result of the public participaticxi
process and is represented in Figure 2.1. This figure shows that the
costs of a standard can actually be reduced v*ien time and money are
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TABLE 2.1    COHXH CBJBCTIONS TO THE PUBLIC INVTOLVEMENT PROCESS
Objecticm
An Agency is obliged to act in the
best interest of the public, so the
public need not be involved.
RESPC»6E
An Agency does not always kncv;
the public good, especially in
local situations.
Only a small percentage of affected
persons can actually be involved.
The organized public can be
well represented by groups.
Public input brings politics into a
professional decisicxi process.
Many agency decisiois are
influenced by politics.
Public input is very expensive and
time consuming for the agency.
Public input reduces cost and
time for inplanentation.
Source: Creighton, Public Involvement Manual, 1980
Perceiued
















IGURE 2.1   ACTUAL YS PERCEIVED COSTS/TIME OF A REGULATION
Source: Creighton, Public Involvement Manual, 1980
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spent previous to the pranulgaticxi of a rule, since the true costs of a
standard must include the iitplementaticxi jdiase. By satisfying the
public demands before pranulgaticai, mutch of the iirplementaticxi cost is
reduced due to the fact that costly citizen suits can be avoided and
industry coipiance is more quickly realized.
Other misunderstandings have been e^^lored by policy analysts who
present them in hopes of preventing unnecessary frustration cxi the part
of participating groups (Buck, 1981; Godschalk, 1981; Creighton,
1980). "Hiree of the major fallacies of public involvanent in
government decision-snaking are presented belcw.
o FALIACy 1: All persons affected by a regulation should be
involved. Ihe belief that all affected persons should
participate in the public participation process is rooted
in a "town-<teeting" approach to public decision-making.
Although ideal, this situation would most certainly cause
increased chaos in an already chaotic process.
Administrative realities and the wide scope of nuch of the
enviroimental legislatioi make representative
participaticMi essential. Fortunately, the public can be
well represented by various groups en both ends of the
spectrum of environmental philosophy. One study has shewn
that the views of 63 percent of the public were adequately
represented by a single envircxmental group (Budc, 1981).
o FALIACy 2; Public participation outcomes are binding to
the Agency. As mentioied in Section I, even though the
pjblic mist be heard from, the Agency is not ccnpelled to
make decisions based vpon the outcome of the public
involvement procedures. However, the public can file suit
against EPA based upon Agency decisions made in light of
the public oornments presented, and the technical evidence
which exists.
o FALIACy 3; Public Participation is an integral part of
Agency decisions. In many cases, the public input has
little bearing cai the outccre of a regulatioi. This is
especially true in issues in v^ich EPA has a well
established regulatory precedent. Where this is the case,
the Agency may be n^rely "going through the motions" in
the public involvement process. However, for regulatory
issues in which there is no foundation for a decisicm, the
Agenc;y may have to incorporate public caiment as an
integral part of its decision-making process.
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Model of Public Participation
Different models have been proposed to depict the process of
public involvement in agency decisions. Godschalk and Stiftel (1981)
proposed a model which defines the process in terms of "exciiange
phases" between an agency and the public. Although the model was
proposed for an agency's planning activities, the phases can be easily
adapted to regulatory analysis. Figure 2.2 depicts the model as
applied to the regulatory decisicxi-making process used by EPA.
This process, as described by the model, involves exchanges
between EPA and the public on three levels, or "phases". The first of
these is an exchange of opportunity. Here, the government agency nust
make itself accessible to the public. In the case of envirormental
rule-making, this availability is displayed nainly in two modes, the
public hearing and the acceptance of conment letters. In turn, the
public is responsible for its cwn involvement and participation in the
cjportunities provided by the Agency. As with all three phases, the
success of public participation depends upon activity on the part of
the Agency and the affected public.
Phase 2 is the Information phase. Here, background information
and points of view from both sides of the issues surrounding a
regulaticsi are presented in the hope of developing sane kind of
consensus \^ich EPA can incorporate into a standard. In this phase the
Agency is made aware of the public will, which most often lacks
consensus.
The Agency also provides information to the public. Currently,
this is done in environmental regulaticai by the required publicaticai of
14
Openness of ^he Regulatory Process
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FIGURE 2.2  EXCHANGE MODEL OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
badtground infomation documents (BID'S) which are available for public
critique. In these background documents, EPA presents all the data and
calculations used to support a proposed or promulgated standard.
Because Phase 2 requires a means for the successful transfer of
information and opinion, its effectiveness depends, to a great extent,
i^xxi the adequacy of the Opportunity jdiase.
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The final jdiase of the Exchange Model is the Response piiase.
Here, changes in the proposed standard and changes in public si^^rt
are manifested. Agency respcaise to the public ccmment process is
relatively strai^^t-forward to assess, since any changes in the
proposed standard are outlined in published documents. Ihe Agency may
change a proposed standard on the basis of its own decisions. Unless
the change is a result of an exchange of informaticai in the public
comment forum, the effectiveness of the citizen participation process
cannot be assessed. Likewise, the Agency may respcaid to perceived
public discontent and change the standard, but unless public
dissatisfaction is brought forward by official public comment
oj^rtunities, the success of citizen participation cannot be measured.
Unlike EPA's respcxise to public input, public response to the
Agency is more difficult to assess and is measured by changes in public
support for the standard. Often, Agency ccnpranise an. an issue can
leave oonpeting groups unsatisfied since ncaie of the involved groups
acheives its stated goal. Yet, regardless of how public opinion on the
regulation changes, there is no doubt that changes in public support
occur as a response to the final rule, and these changes can be used to
measure the success of public participation.
In reality, the three phases presented in the Exchange Model are
used repeatedly. The announoanent of projected changes sparks the need
for additicxial ccmment frcm the public, and new hearings are scheduled
and the public cctnment period is extended or reopened. Still, the
Exchange Model presented by Godschalk and Stiftel can be used to
analyze the effectiveness of the public comment process. By providing
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a breakdown of the different steps in v*iich the process is carried out,
the success of each of the three jAiases in the model can be assessed
and then combined to provide an indicatiai of the success of the entire
process.
Literature and Models
The body of literature that exists for the analysis of public
ocnment indicates a najor problen with the process. A great deal of
misunderstanding surrounds the public involvanent process, and
misperceptions of the process have raised objections to citizen
involvement. Agency decisions are not always based extensively on the
results of citizen involvement, nor is the agency c^liged to act in
accordance to the public will.
In additicMi to describing the utility of citizen coranent, models
have been proposed to aid in the analysis of the public involvement
process as a whole. Godschalk's Exchange Model can be adapted for use
in envircMimental rule-making as well. The Exchange model provides a
method for analysis based upon the exchange of opportunity,
information, and response which occurs during the public involvement
process.
SECTION III - RBSULATCRY HISTCRY CF ARSENIC
The history of the regulatiai of arsenic as an air pollutant is an
interesting one,  and provides a good exairple of the process required to
prottulgate a standard under the Clean Air Act. More inportantly for
this stud|y, the standard highlights the public involvanent processes
i:ised by EPA and prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act of
1947. Public involvement methods described by the Administrative
Procedures Act include both the formal rule-snaking procedures, for
exanple, citizen suits, and informal notice-and-oocnment period rule-
making procedures. EPA also involved the affected public in workshops
and public hearings v*iich are not required by the Clean Air Act. The
following section briefly outlines the history of the regulation of
arsenic as an air pollutant, including both the standard-setting
approadi used and the role which public participation played in the
development of the final standard.
An analysis of the adequacy of the actual standards, in terms of
public health benefits, is not essential to the issue of public
participation in the standard-setting process. Indeed, it is well
beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, an analysis of the actual
value of the regulation is not addressed.
Need For a Regulation
Sectioi 112 was added to the Clean Air Act in 1970 to cover all
air pollutants not already ccaisidered by the national ambient air
quality standards v*iich were developed under secticxis 108-110. Since
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sections 108-110 cover only criteria pollutants used by the agency to
monitor air quality trends, section 112 is the primary mechanism for
the regulaticxi of toxic air pollutants. As an air pollutant vMch
posed a significant risk of adverse health effects, inorganic arsenic
was considered a candidate pollutant for a national emissicxi standard
regulation under sectiai 112.
The Clean Air Act, as amended in 1977, directed the Agency to
promulgate a rule to limit arsenic anissions under secticxi 112.
Although EPA had dealt with the country's main inorganic arsenic
emissiai sources (non-ferrous smelters) in 1976 with a new source
performance standard, the Agency failed to specifically consider
arsenic emissicais in the regulation (Ajax, 1985). Environmental groups
petitioned the Agency in the matter, and in response to this pressure
EPA made a commitment to begin the data collection process essential to
the proposal of a regulaticai.
In additicxi. Congress also pressured the Agency to act an the
arsenic issue. Since oily two hazardous air pollutants had been
regulated by the Agency under section 112 during 1970 to 1977, Ccxigress
intentionally listed seven hazardous air pollutants for the agency to
study and regulate. According to the Act, a national emissicais
standard for any hazardous air pollutant must be proposed one-half year
following the official listing of a hazardous air pollutant (HAP) in
the Federal Register, and promulgated just one-half year after the
proposal.
In June, 1980 EPA listed arsenic as a hazardous air pollutant.
This listing procedure is iit^rtant as it begins the secticxi 112 rule-
making process. As the seventh hazardous air pollutant listed
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following radicaiuclides, benzene, vinyl chloride, asbestos, mercury,
and beryllium, it was the last of the seven chemicals that the Clean
Air Act specifically directed EPA to act upon in secticxi 122.
The basis for this listing, beycaid the congressional mandate, was
a number of Agency studies which showed arsenic to be a probable human
carcinogen. Evidence for this classification was the consistent
increased risk found in different arsenic exposure studies, as well as
the observed specificity of tumor sites (skin and lungs) and the high
relative risks whidi resulted vAien conpared to other studied
carcinogens. In a major study from the\Agency's Carcinogen Assessment
Group, arsenic's carcinogenic potency was ranked in the first quartile
of 52 suspect carcinogens analyzed (EPA, 1984).
In additiai, airborne emissions of arsenic were well documented
and significant. Enissioi sources had been characterized, and
emissions quantified. In some instances, high arsenic atdssion sources
were found in areas with large populations. Since EPA's definition of
"hazardous" requires both significant exposures as well as an
established toxicity, the listing of arsenic as a hazardous air
pollutant was well justified.
However, it was not until June 20, 1983, two years after the
deadline specified by the Clean Air Act, that an arsenic rule was
proposed. Even then, the Agency was forced into issuing the proposed
regulaticai by a U.S. District Court after suit by the State of New
York. Stating that the administrator had "violated her duties to
promulgate regulations for the listed airborne arsenic", EPA's claim of
"administrative iiipossibility" was not accepted as an excuse for its
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lack of timeliness in the regulatioi process (New York vs Gorsuch, No.
81 CIV 6678 (WCT)). EPA was given the statutory deadline of six months
to propose a regxiLation for arsenic.
In the proposed rule, source categories of arsenic emissions were
selected as targets for regulaticai. The most in^ortant of these were
the primary copper smelters vAiich emitted more than one fourth of all
airborne arsenic nationwide (EPA, 1983). Since this relatively
volatile metal is present as an iitpirity in nearly all copper deposits,
smelters anit arsenic v*ien roasting, smelting and converting the copper
ore at high tenperatures. The inorganic arsenic is emitted fron tall
stacks which vent the furnaces and ccxiverters and also escapes existing
control equipment and is emitted as a low-level fugitive.
Because there were two very distinct classes of arsenic-laden ores
lased by the copper smelters, a proposed standard for smelters was
published for eadi of the groups according to the arsenic content of
the copper ores used to produce the blister copper product. Figure 3.1
displays the range of arsenic containing ores used by the smelters.
Only one smelter, the ASAROO-Taccma smelter, fell into the high-arsenic
ore category, vtiile the natiai's other fourteen primary smelters refine
copper fron low-arsenic content ores.
The next most inportant emission source was the glass
manufacturers. Glass manufacturing plants were included as a source
category since seme manufacturers add arsenic to the raw materials used
in the production of glass. Arsenic, v*ien added to the glass mixture,
provides increased clarity and sparkle, as well as helps to catalyze
the transformaticMi of the silica mixture into glass (Troy, 1986). As





















U.S. Primary Copper Smelters
Figure 3.1    Percent Incrgan-ic Arsenic In Feed Materials At Primary Cop:
Smelters
From:(Ajax.   IS85)   '
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emitted fron the glass mixture during the heating process, and emitted
as both stack and fugitive emissions. As a group, glass manufacturers
were a relatively minor source of arsenic emissicxis, accounting for 7
percent, or 37 tons/year of airborne arsenic nationwide (EPA, 1983).
After these two categories, there were many smaller sources of
arsenic emissions in the country, c«ly one of which was considered
major enough to constitute a public health hazard, dose industries
not considered were zinc and lead smelters (both primary and
secondary), zinc oxide production plants, cotton gins, and arsenic
trioxide/inetallic arsenic chemical plants. The arsenic diemical plant
category was not considered for regulation in the initial proposal but
<
was later proposed and promulgated in a rule which affected only the
arsenic production plant used in conjunction with the nation's lone
high-arsenic primary copper smelter.
The Proposed Standards
All the comtnents analyzed in this study pertain to the proposed
standards for high- and low-arsenic smelters and the glass
manufacturing plants. Because of their iiiportance to understanding the
issues raised by conmenters, the proposed standards are outlined
below. Included in the outline is the risk data used by the EPA for
all the proposed standards. The risk assessment/risk management
process is outlined as well.
• RISK ASSESS^EW^; In order to propose a national emissions standard
for a hazardous air pollutant, an air pollutant must "ccaitribute
to...an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
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reversible, or incapacitating irreversible, illness" (CAA Secticai
112(A)(1)). In the case of inorganic arsenic, three
epidaiiiological studies were found vAiich indicated an increased
incidence of lung cancer in smelter workers. No epidemiological
studies existed v^ch analyzed arsenic exposure and the incidence
of other suspected adverse health effects, such as peripheral
neuropathy, growth retardation and brain dysfunction amcxig
children, hyperkeratosis, and an increase in adverse birth
outcomes. Risk estimates used in the standard were based entirely
upon the incidence of lung cancer.
Ifeing data fran the three studies, the risk per unit of
arsenic exposure was calculated to be 2.95x10 per ug/in , the
geometric mean of the three values available (EPA, 1983). Using
the Agerxr/'s conputerized Human Eb^xDSure Model, this risk value
was then ^plied to populations inhabiting regicxis within a 20 km
radius around the ensiicxis source. Because the carputerized model
incorporates meteorological data to model the dispersal of the
arsenic to areas around the source, the resultant risks were a
conbination of populaticxi density and estimated ambient air
concentraticai of arsenic.
Table 3.2 displays the lung cancer risk estimates used in
proposing the standards. Smoking and benzene exposure risks are
listed along with the other sources to provide a relative
reference as to the severity of arsenic risks. The attributable
risk percent column shows the percent of all lung cancers expected
in the affected population v*iich could be theoretically attributed
to arsenic exposure from eacJi source category.
• HIGH-At^SENlC CDPPHR SMELTERS; Natiaial anissions standards for
the control of arsenic emissicxis from primary copper smelters were
proposed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act July 20, 1983 (48
FR 33112). Included in the high-arsenic category were smelters
processing feed material with an annual average arsenic content of
0.7% or greater. The only existing smelter in this category was
located in Tacoma, WA and owned by ASARCD, Incorporated. Three
regiilatory alternatives were proposed by EPA in /^ril of 1983 for
applicaticxi to arsenic emissions from Tacoma smelter.
Regulatory alternative 1 represented the "no-action"
alternative whidi reflected the current level of control.
Alternative 2 correspcxided to the caitrol of fugitive arsenic
emissions by the application of an emission control technology
already in place in some smelters in the country. The technologiy
required was a secondary hood/horizontal air curtain for converter
fugitive emissions. The final alternative was to require the
smelter to process ores which were virtually free of arsenic. Ihe
Agency "felt very strongly that this alternative would close down
the smelter" (Ruckelshaus, 1984).
Alternative 2 would have provided cxily a limited reducticai in
enissions, estimated to be 39 percent or 110 tons per year
(EPA, 1983). No other anissions reducticai alternative was
proposed, except for alternative 3 which would have closed the
plant. EPA felt that the best available control technology was
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TABLE 3.1    RISK VAUTRS USED TN THE PROPOSED ARSFNTC STANTftRDS
(Listed by Source Category)
TOTAL 'iaiAL NUMBER OF
NUMBER ARSENIC EXPOSED LUNG CANCERS ''atirib.
SOJRCE CF EMISSIONS POREATICN PREDICTED RISK
CATEXSQRY PLANTS (tons/yr) (  < 20km ) (annually) (percent)
Not Included r*^
Primary Pb Shielters 5 38 2,200,000 0.1 0.01%
Secoidary Pb Shielters 35 3 70,000,000 0.4 < 0.01%
Primary Zinc Shielters 5 < 1 5,000,000 < 0.1 < 0.01%
Zinc Oxide Plants 2 9 2,000,000 0.1 0.01%
Cotton Gins > 300 5 not determined -----




1 310 368,000 17.4 11.55%
14 812 650,200 1.6 0.62%
Glass Manufacuturers 15 37 4,166,000 1.2 0.07%
'lUmLH b'Oi. PKOHJSKI): 30 1159 5,184,200 20.2 0.97%




— — 5,184,000 5.2 0.25%
^ ͣ~" ^ ͣ^w 5,184,000 622.0 30.00%
Percentage of lung cancers in affected populaticxi which are caused by
source emissions. Based cxi a lung cancer rate of 40/100,00 ("U.S. Cancer
Mortality Rates and Trends, 1950-1979", EPA 600/l-83-015a, September 1983)
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Risk Assessment of Prinary and Secondary Lead
Smelters, Primary Zinc Smelters, Zinc Oxide Plants, Cotton Gins, and
Arsenic Chemical Plants",EPA-450/5-82-002, i^ril, 1985. NDTE: Affected
population estiirated for these classes are for a 50 km radius.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Ehiissicxis from High-Arsenic Primary Copper
Smelters - Badcground Information for Proposed Standards",
EPA-450/3-83-009a, ;^ril, 1983.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Emissicxis frcm Low-Arsenic Primary Capper
Smelters - Background Information for Proposed Standards",
EPA-450/3-83/010a, April, 1983.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Ehiissicns from Glass Manufacturing Plants -
Background Information for Proposed Standards",EPA-450/3-83-011a,
April, 1983.
Source: "Air Toxics Problem in the United States: An Analysis of Cancer
Risks for Selected Pollutants", EPA,450/l-85-001, May, 1985.
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already in place at arsenic enission points in the plant. Iftider
these alternatives, the Agency proposed to regulate the high-
arsenic primary ccKJer smelters category under alternative 2.
• LOW-ARSENIC (]CPPER SffiLTERS: National emissiois standards for the
coitrol of arsenic emissiais from primary cqE^r smelters
processing feed material with an annual average arsenic ccxitent of
0.7% or less were also proposed on July 20, 1983 (48 ER 33112).
The 14 anelters which process low-arsenic ores were evaluated for
both process and fugitive anissions to determine areas v*iere a
reducticai in arsenic emissicxis was possible. The Agency's i^ril,
1983 review led to the development of five regulatory
alternatives.
Alternative 1, the "no-action" alternative, wDuld not affect
the facilities. Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 provided for different
levels of enission control by the applicaticsi of various control
technologies and process techniques. Alternative 5, like the
final alternative proposed for the high-arsenic category, would
have required the smelters to process ores v*iich were virtually
free of arsenic content.
Ihe Agency selected two alternatives for the proposed
standard. The two alternatives chosen affected six smelters
nationwide. Oliese six plants would have been required to install
secondary hoods/air curtains cm their ccxiverter operaticxis to
control fugitive arsenic emissicais. In addition, four of the six
would have had to install control devices for fugitive emissions
from matte and slag tapping operaticais. Ihe selection of the two
alternatives in the proposed regulation would have resulted in a
17 percent, or 137 tons/year, decrease in arsenic anissions from
this source category (EPA, 1983).
• GLASS MANUFACTURING PLANTS; National emissions standards for the
control of arsenic emissicxis from glass manufacturing plants were
also proposed July 20, 1983 (48 FR 33112). Over 400 oonpanies are
involved in the production of the various types of glass, but only
fifteen furnaces in the glass industry manufacture glass v*iich
ccMitains arsenic (EPA, 1983). The Pgency proposed three
alternatives for regulaticai in ;^ril, 1983.
Alternative 1, similar to the smelter category, was the no-
action alternative which represented current levels of emission
coitrol which existed at the time. Alternative 2 represented the
ccmtrol achievable with a fabric filter or electrostatic
precipitator installed oi the furnaces in plants v*iich add arsenic
to the glass batch. The last alternative was the most restrictive
and would have required the ccnplete elimination of arsenic in the
manufacture of glass. Of these three possibilities, alternative 2
was chosen as the proposed naticmal emissions standard. Ihe
reducticm of arsenic emissicms in the eight affected plants was
predicted to be 36 tons, or 88 percent (EPA, 1983).
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Public Ccmment Period
The proposed standards prcnpted an unprecedented nuntoer of
comments from outside the i^ency. The EPA had never received such a
large number of comments relating to a single group of proposed
standards. A large number of comments were related to the ASAROO-
Taoana primary copper smelter. Ihe high cancer risks projected by EPA
models and the fragile economic situation of the copper smelter were
translated into an iirportant ccranunity issue.
The Agency felt that the intense local awareness in the Tacoma
area was an opportunity to involve public in the standard-setting
process to a degree v^ich had never before been considered in
environmental rule-making. In order to effectively involve the public,
EPA sent out a team of officials to hold three workshops preceding the
public hearings. Ihese workshops, all held in the Tacoma area, were
well attended by concerned citizens, smelter arployees, and industry
and environmental leaders alike. The workshops helped to explain
information in the proposed standard and the risk assessment process
upcwi which it was based. In addition, the Agency also provided public
education on issues such as risk management and emissicxi coitrol
techniques through local television and newspaper advertisements.
The public education campaign ended with three days of public
hearings held Novanber 2-4, 1983 in !I^ooma. At these meetings, Agency
officials responded to the ccaicerns of groups and citizens in the area
about the proposed inorganic arsenic standard and the risk assessment
used. Over 100 individuals were heard from during these hearings.
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the majority of v*iich supported the proposed standard as a reasonable
oonpromise between jobs and health (EPA, 1984).
An additiaial public hearing session was held just four days later
in Washington, D.C. Lasting just one day, November 8, 1983, 13
speakers were heard, mostly from the affected glass and copper
industries. Uncertainties in the modeling studies were brought up at
both hearings and EPA, along with environmental groups and the affected
industries, met c«i December 20, 1983 to discuss the data used for the
Taccxna smelter (Ajax, 1986).
Because of requests by ccxnnenters for additional time to prepare
oral testimDny and to review the revised modeling results for the
ASAROO Tacana copper smelter, the Agency postpaied closure ai>d reopened
the public conment period three times (48 FR 38009, 48 FR 55880, 49 re
36877). The conment period on the proposed standards officially closed
on November 5, 1984.
The Agency went to great lengths to solicit public ocmnent during
the preparation of the arsenic standard. Because the Agency was so
active in Tacoraa, some coramenters felt that EPA was actually asking the
public to vote on the proposed standard. Mministrator Ruckelshaus, in
an effort to assure these coramenters that he was not abdicating his
responsibility in the matter, made the Agency's position clear in a
speech given at Princeton in February of 1984:
"We organized an extraordinary canpaign of public
education in Tacana. So unusual was this kind of event
that sane inferred that I was abdicating my
respoisibility for this decisic«i. After sane initial
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confusion on this score, we made it clear that it was
entirely wy decisicxi, and that although I wanted to
hear, I was not catmitted to heed ... I suppose some
would have been happier continuing in their fond belief
that we could provide absolute safety with absolute
certainty, and were disturbed by these proceedings."
(Ruckelshaus 1984)
In addition to the information gathered in the public hearings and
the workshops, EPA also received public comment on the standards by
letter. Many groups sent comments or printed copies of their testiiroiy
presented at the public hearings, since written letters are considered
jto be the caily admissible evidence of a oonplaint in future litigaticai
(Stewart, 1977). More than 650 letters were received by the Agency on
the ASAROO-Tacana standard alone. When all source categories are
considered, more than 800 commenters sutmtted questions and comments
pertaining to the proposed standards. Most of the comments received by
the Agency raised several issues, and, of course, many of the comments
were r^jeated by other ccinmenters.
As required, EPA considered all comments and responded to those
questicxis v^ich raised significant issues. The Agency was then
required to publish all comments which were deemed "significant", and
thus required a formal response. In issues relating to the risk
assessment procedures used in the proposed inorganic arsenic standards,
the Agency published over 2300 conments alcMie.
Comments were grouped by issue and then all comments relating to
each issue were listed by EPA. "Hie official EPA response followed the
listing of all comments received which pertained to that particular
issue. The document caitaining official Agency respcaise to the risk
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assessment issues was published in April, 1985. For camients relating
to more technical issues, such as the selection of best available
control technology or the use of different cost models, the Agency
published separate documents for each of the proposed standards in
May, 1986.
Prcmulgated Standards
Promulgated national emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants for inorganic arsenic were published in the Federal Register
August 4, 1986 (51 FR 27956). The effect of public ooctment can only be
assessed by examining the final standards, since any changes made to
the standard can be identified by comparing the proposed and the final
standards. Oherefore, a brief discussion of the changes which occurred
follows.
• RISK ASSESSMENT; Two additional studies were added to the
epidCTiiological data base. This additicxTal^information increased
the unit risk estimate to 4.39x10 per ug/in , a 48 percent
increase over the proposed unit risk value (EPA, 1985). However,
emission estimates were revised downward as conment on the
proposed estimates was received by the Agency. The canbination of
these two factors greatly decreased the estimated risks from the
arsenic anission sources natiaiwide. Table 3.2 presents the
updated lung cancer risk estimates used in promulgating the
arsenic standards. Again, smoking and benzene exposure risks are
given to provide a relative reference as to the severity of
arsenic risks. The attributable risk percent column shows the
percent of all lung cancers es^jected in the affected populaticai
which could be theoretically attributed to arsenic exposure from
each source category.
In addition to the changes in the emissions and unit risk
data, the Agency expanded its caipaterized model to include all
persons living within 50 km of each emissions source. Biis change
was due to oonmenters who felt that significanly exposed
populations existed beycsid the 20 km limit used in the prcposed
standards. Public comment also caused the Agency to use measured
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TART.R ^.7 RISK VALUES USED IN THE PROMULGATED ARSQIIC STANDARDS
(Listed by Source Category)
'lUirAL TOTAL NUMBER CF
NUMBER ARSENIC EXPOSED LUN3 CANCERS ''Ai'lWlB.
SOURCE CF £MSSIONS POHJIATICN PKEDlCi'lD RISK
CATEGORY PLANTS (tons/yr) ( < 50km ) (annually) (percent)
Proposed:   ,
Arsenic Plants 8 < 1 12,600,000 < 0.1 < 0.01%
High-Arsenic Stnelters''
Low-Arsenic SiiBlters
1 129 1,800,000 2.9 0.40%
14 306 1,900,000 . 1.0 0.13%
Glass Manufacuturers 15 37 11,600,000 0.4 0.01%
TOTALS: 30 472 27,900,000 4.3 0.04%
Cociparison: (using fhe above population)
Benzene Bndssions
f
— — 27,900,000 27.9 0.25%
Cigarette Smoking •^~ ^^ 27,900,000 3348.0 30.00%
Percentage of lung cancers in affected populaticxi which are caused by
source emissiais. Based on a lung cancer rate of 40/100,00 ("U.S. Cancer
Mortality Rates and Trends, 1950-1979", EPA 600A-83-015a, September 1983)
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Risk Assessment of Primary and Seccaidary Lead
Smelters, Prinary Zinc Snelters, Zinc Oxide Plants, Cotton Gins, and
Arsenic Chemical Plants",EPA-450/5-82-002, i^ril, 1985.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Enissiois fran High-Arsenic Primary Copper
Smelters - Badcground Information for Pronulgated Standards",
EPA-450/3-83-009b, Not published.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Ehiissicais fran Primary Copper Smelters and
Arsenic Chemical Plants - Background Information for Pronulgated
Standards", EPA-450/3-83/010b, May, 1986.
Source: "Inorganic Arsenic Ehiissicxis from Glass Manufacturing Plants -
Background Information for Promulgated Standards", EPA-450/3-83-011b,
May, 1986.
Source: "Air Toxics Problem in the tfiiited States: An Analysis of Cancer
Risks for Selected Pollutants", EPA,450/1-85-001, May, 1985.
•;; ͣ:'"^?f!!!^S"'S?
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antoient arsenic anissions data in areas around the Taooma smelter,
instead of relying on the modeled anissions levels. Ihe change in
the risk assessment as a result of using ambient data was not
great, since the measured data did not differ significantly from
the modeled data, particularly v*ien caipared to the relative
uncertainties in the risk assessment process (Fitzsimmons, 1986).
• HIGH-ARSENIC POPPER SMELTERS; Although EPA prepared a final
Standard for the high-arsenic category of primary copper smelters,
a standard was never promulgated. There was no need for the
standard since the ASARPO-Taccma smelter closed in March, 1985
before a rule could be finalized.
LOW-ARSENIP POPPER SMELTERS; The final rule promulgated for low-
arsenic smelters, re-named to include all primary ccf^r smelters,
incorporated several significant changes v*iich were pronpted by
comments received by the Agency. The two most notable dianges
occurred from data submitted by the copper smelting industry
during the notioe-and-ccrament period of the standard setting
process. These changes included a 62 percent decrease in the
overall enissions from this source category and a 16 percent
increase in the capital costs projected for the installation of
required control equipment (EPA, 1986). Table 3.3 shows some of
the changes made in the anissions and cost data.
Probably the most significant change in the proposed standard
was the ccaiverter feed cut-off level for those smelters which
would be affec±ed by the standards. Tiie proposed cut-off,
affecting 6 out of the 14 smelters, was increased by an order of
magnitude to include CHily one smelter. In additiai, the
provisions for emissiai reducticxis for slag and matte tapping
operaticxis were dropped since the revised arsenic emission rates
indicated that "the small reductiai in public health risk
resulting from matte and slag tapping controls did not warrant the
imposition of these ccaitrols at any of the existing smelters"
(EPA, 1986) The final standard resulted in a maxinum enoission
reduction of 4.4 tons of airborne arsenic per year or 1.4
percent. To pxit this envirconental iitpact into perspective, the
maximum reduction in expected cancers from the standard was
estimated to be 0.4 cases per year.
Public ccrament also prarpted EPA to add additicxial
provisicffis. These included an increase in opacity monitoring and
several steps which were required to minimize anissions due to
malfunctions and upsets. Upsets and malfunctions refer mostly to
coitrol equipment start-ups and ccmtrol equipment repair or
maintenance shut-downs. These sources of anissions had been left
out of the proposal but were added after state regulators and
envircximental groups brought them to the Agency's attention.
As an attachment to the standard on copper smelters, EPA
proctulgated standards on the arsenic chemical plant operated by
ASAROO in Taccraa. The Tacoma capper  smelter was closed down but
ASARPO had not indicated any plans to discontinue operation of
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ASAROO-Hayden 30.1 5.4 82%
ASAROO-El Paso 27.5 16.7 39%
Kennecott-Utah 8 1.5 81%
Kennecott-ffcGill 45.9 10.1 78%
Phelps Dodge-Morenci 6.9 1»9 72%
Hielps Dodge-Ajo 2.6 U.5 81%














ASARCTKHayden 1,700 3,660 115%
ASAROO-El Paso 1,375 1,850 35%
Kennecott-Utah 5,200 8,800 69%
Kennecott-Hayden 6,730 8,000 19%
Kennecott-McGill 8,760 7,150 -18%
Rielps Dodge-Morenci 8,530 12,970 52%
32,295 42,430 31%
Ccxiverter fugitive anissicxis (EPA-4503/-83-010b pg 1-4-17)
^Capital cost estimates (EPA-450/3-83-01Ob pg 1-8-17)
the arsenic chemical productioi plant vrtuch had been processing
stockpiled smelter waste. Consequently, EPA felt that the
proposed fugitive ccMitrol measures for the arsenic plant should be
finalized. The rule pronulgated for this arsenic plant required
no specific coitrol technologies. Rather, the standard dananded a
modification of work practices at the facility, including the
preparation of a regular inspection, maintenance, and housekeeping
plan. The reduction of arsenic emissions and the resulting
- '.'sm^ww^'^WT' ͣ'^'•^f?^'^
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iiiprovanent in public health was not estimated by the Agency since
the plant was not required to install any particular control
device.
• GLASS MANUFflCTORINS PIANTS; Changes were also made to the
standard proposed for the glass manufacturing category, ttilike
the smelters category, the cost and anissions estimates were not
significantly changed. However, the cut-off limit for
unccxitrolled arsenic emissions was raised 625 percent and the
Agency also allowed ai^ furnace which added more than 2.8 tcxis per
year of arsenic to the batch to chose any ccxiceivable ccxitrol
option as long as an anissicai reduction of arsenic was at least 85
percent over the uncontrolled level. An emissicxi testing
exaipticxi was given to any furnace v*iich added less than 8 tons of
arsenic per year to the batch.
The increase in the cut-off and specific exsiptiais ocmbined
to reduce the number of affected facilities from 8 to 2. One of
the plants affected was scheduled to change production to a
ncHiarsenic glass type, vAiile the other was expected install an
electrostatic precipitator. Expected arsenic emission reduction
was 16.1 tons per year or 43 percent naticsnwide (EPA, 1986).
Final Outcane
Emission standards for arsenic were finally promulgated more than
five years after the statutory deadline given in section 112 of the
Clean Air Act. Public ccmment resulted in a large number of
significant dianges to the proposed standards, particulary in the data
used by EPA to estimate emissions and cortpliance costs. These changes
reflected a reduction in the ej^jected health impacts, as arsenic
emissiCTi estimates were revised downward. Consequently, the
promulgated standards were much less restrictive upon the arsenic-
emitting industries. Figure 3.2 is a timeline which graphically
depicts the series of events that occurred during the prcmulgation of














































































































FIGURES.2   RRSENIC   STRNDflRD   PROMULGRTION    TIMELINE
' "VF^     ͣ-P^-»,"i»Sw^*s' ͣ "S^SSP^*" "^
EECTICW IV - METHXS
Data Collection
Ccranents nade on the standard were published in three documents:
Inorganic Arsenic NESHAPS; Response to Public Comments on Health, Risk
Assessment, and Risk Management (EPA-450/5-85-001), Inorganic Arsenic
Bnissicais frcm Primary Cog^r Snelters and Arsenic Plants - Badcground
Information for Promulgated Standards (EPA-450/3-83-010b), and
Inorganic Arsenic Bnissiais from Glass Manufacturing Plants -
Badcground Informaticai for Promulgated Standards (EPA-450-3/83-011b).
Ihese documents contain all of the public oonments considered
significant by the Agercy during the development of the standard. Only
these comments are publicly available. The documents also ccxitain the
official Agency respcMises to the questions raised by the ccmmenters.
The first document, subsequently referred to as the "Risk
Assessment" document, contains those comments that raised questions
regarding the risk assessment used to select arsenic as a hazardous air
pollutant, to select the various source categories of arsenic
anissiais, and to estimate health risks based ai these emissions. The
risk document includes comments cxi the risk assessment process used for
glass manufacturers, arsenic chanical plants, and higji- and low-arsenic
primary copper smelters.
As was mentioned in Secticai 3 of this study, the single facility
in the high-arsenic category closed down before a final rule was
promulgated. However, since comments on the risk assessment process
had already been published, many of the submitted ocmments had
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already evdced an official response from the Agency and are included in
the analysis presented in the next secticxi. Conments made on the
technical issues surrounding the high-arsenic smelter were not
published and the Agency made no official respcxise. Ccaisequently,
these oomnents are not included in this analysis.
The risk assessment dociment, released more than 16 maiths before
the final standard was prorulgated, contains more than 2350 individual
ooranents. To put this in perspective, the risk assessment document
contains more than 10 times the nuirber of comments appearing in the
other two documents v*iich related to more tedinical issues. Table 4.1
presents a summary of the types of issues raised by ooramenters in the
risk assessment document.
The other two coment documents contain 224 total ccnments
relating to the technical issues of the Arsenic NESEJAP and are
subsequently referred to as the "Technical Issues" documents. Any
questions or conments raised regarding EPA's cost estimates, choice of
source categories and selection of ccxitrol equipment were published in
Table 4.1 CATEX3QMZATI0N OF Q^WENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT
_________Category______________ _________Category (oont.)
1. Listing of Arsenic as a HAP 5. Anple Margin of Safety
2. Exposure and Risk Determination 6. Eooncmics as a Factor
3. Acceptable Risk Determination 7. Jctos versus Health
4. Quality of Life 8. Victim Conpensatiai
_-.-§:--3*»tf^»rs^~'—
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Table 4.2 CftlEQCRIZATICN OF OCMtENTS IN TEX3JNICAL ISSUES DOOWENTS
_________Category______________ Category (oont.)
1. Arsenic Bniission Estimates 4. Start-Ups and Shutdowns
2. Emission Control Technologies 5. Cost Estimates and Impacts
3. Coipliance Provisions 6. Test Methods and Monitoring
these two documents. Issues raised in these documents are provided in
Table 4.2.
Conments are listed without the identification of the author and
each ccinment is identified in the text only by a unique number. All '
authors are listed by number in a separate secticxi of the publication.
Ihese identifiers were added later after all other information was
recorded. This published oomnent/response format provided a good
opportunity to ccnpile all the informatiai needed to analyze EPA's
respaise to conments without firsthand knowledge of the identity of the
person or group raising the questiai.
While examining the questions raised, it was possible to determine
the "intent" (type of change demanded) from the ooninent. The
determination of intent is essential to analyzing the iitpact of a
comment since only those conments v*iich requested dhanges were
considered by EPA. Because of the inherently subjective nature of
determining the "intent" of each particular questiai, a categorization
scheme was used to to organize the "intents" of all the questions and
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comments into four mutually exclusive groups. The categorization
scheme used is shown in Table 4.3.
After categorizing the iiiplied intent of each of the 2601
ccmnents, the official EPA response to each oonment was characterized.
EPA respcxided in many different ways to the ocnments, with responses
ranging frcm "EPA disagrees with the canment" to a 12 page





Exarrples of Authors' Ccrtiments
Exposure threshold exists
Standard is too costly in its present form
Standard will cost too many jobs
Arsenic is not a proven carcinogen
Other epidemiological studies are negative
No ejcposure threshold exists
Proposed    Standard uses the correct ratio of costs/benefits
Standard    Standard will adequately protect the public health
is Good     Standard ignores insignificant sources of emissicxis




Risk estimate used is too low
Standard is overly concerned with cost
Standard will not protect the public health
Standard does not consider other pollutants
Other risk factors (i.e. skin cancers) not considered
Not Standard should require cleanup of area soils
J^licable Standard should be set for aittDient air coioentraticais
or Standard should require costs of travel to hearings
Classifiable Standard is based upon bad data
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justification of the selecticai of best available control technology
(EPA, 1985). Exanples of Agency responses and the assigned categories
are listed in Table 4.4.
The final step in the data analysis task was to aggregate
ooranenters into groups. Each ooranenter was assigned to a particular
group category. Table 4.5 lists the 25 different groups used to
categorize the authors. The assignment of each of the comments to one
of the groi5)s listed in Table 4.5 was acootrplished by using the index
given in published background information documents.




Exanples of EPA Response
EPA disagreed with the ccranents made.
Questicxi/Ccrament did not apply to Section 112.
Considered;
Not Changed
EPA re-analyzed with ambient rather than modeled
exposure data.
EPA considered inpact of other health affects,




EPA revised the standard to include regulaticai of
proper work practices.





EPA increased estimated costs for control equipnent.
EPA raised the throughput cutoffs to reduce the
number of affected smelters and glass plants.
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Smelter Crisis Education Project
Pierce Co Central Labor Council
United Steelworkers of America
WA State Labor Council AFL-CIO
Natural Resources Defense Council
Grand Canyon, Cascade Chapters
Greenpeace USA, Greenpeace NW








Consultants in Epid & Occup Health









Natioial Cotton Council of America
Plains Cotton Growers, Inc
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Table 4.5 (ccxit) GROUPS PARmCIPATING IN THE ARSENIC STANDARD
Group Name Subgroup Name Actual Participants
Government (G) Local (L)
State (S)
Natioial (N)
Chelan Co Public Utility District 1
Puget Sound APCA
Seattle-King Co Dept of Pub Health
Taoona-Pierce Co Board of Health
Taooraa-Pierce Co Econ Devlptrant Bd
Toledo Dept of Public Utilities
Vashai-Maury Island Corrm Council
NJ Dept of Envr Protecticxi
m Envr Inprovement Divisicxi
NY Dept of Law
PA D^t of Envr Resources
TX Air Caitrol Board
WA Dept of Ecology
WA Dept of Labor and Industries
WA Dept of Social & Hlth Services
Centers for Disease Control
Natl Inst of Envr Health Sciences
Office of Management and Budget
Representatives (R) 1 Senator, 3 Ccxigressmen





Businesses (B) - none -
Hearings (H)   Taooma, WA (T)
Brown U - Dept of Geol Science
Princeton U - Dept of Religion
U of Michigan - Sch of Pub Health
U of Pennsylvania - Sch of Finance
U of Puget Sound - Dept of Boon
U of Washington - Dept of Civl Engn
U of WashiiKfton - Sch of Pub Health
U of Wisconsin - Dept of Psychology
American Lung Association
Neurology & Neurosurgury Assoc, Inc
Pierce County Medical Bureau
St Luke's Med Bldg, St JoseE*i Hbsp
56 Different Businesses
Bicentennial Pavilian, Tacana WA
Washingtcxi, DC (W) Jefferson Auditorium, Washingtoi DC
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A total of 2601 ocranents and questiois were categorized by using
the following variables:
1. Chapter/Publicaticxi .... Document & major category of question
2. SecticMi................Subcategory of each question type
3. Question...............Particular issue brought up by question
4. Source .................CJoninent format, letter or public hearing
5. Author's Number ........EPA assigned number - 2 numbers recorded
6. Author's Intent ........ Intent of the questiai. Table 4.3
7. EPA Response...........EPA acticxi on the questiai
8. Result .................Result of EPA action. Table 4.4
9. Author's Major Group ... Major category of the author. Table 4.5
10. Author's Subgroijp......Minor category of the author. Table 4.5
Data Analysis
With nearly 30,000 variables to ccaisider, the canments from each
of the published documents were loaded onto an IBM-PC XT using
Lotus 1-2-3 software. Data were entered without assigning the author's
identity. Only the author's number was assigned. These data were then
transferred to a dBASE III Plus data base file.
After entering these data, a second data base was created which
included canmenters' numbers and the assigned groups and subgroups.
Ihe oomnenter's identity was then added tothe first data file using a
dBASE III Plus program to match each cament to the author's identity.
The intent of the author's question was recorded without observer bias
vhich would result from firsthand knowledge of the identification of
the author.
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Following the caipilaticm of each of the variables found in the
2601 ccraments, the data were read into a large file for oonputerized
statistical manipulaticxi and analysis. Before the data were analyzed,
selected r^resentative questions from the original documents were
examined and reviewed in order to provide quality assurance/control
checks on the variables recorded. In addition, data were continuously
verified throu^out the statistical analysis period v*ienever unexpected
results occurred. These checks insured accuracy in the raw data used
for the analysis.
The data were analyzed with a PC-based statistical package,
SYSTAT. The SYSTAT program allowed for analysis with grouping by types
of questions, by the groijp categories, or by the source of the
OOTinent. With this approach, each group could be analyzed
independently and then carpared to other groips who participated in the
standard-setting process.
The general "intent" from each group participating in the process
was obtained by averaging an assigned raanerical measure of the intent
of each of the camients subnitted to the Agency. Ihis average intent
was then caipared to other groups. The average intent indicated the
environmental ideology of each group category.
The effectiveness of each of the various groups was evaluated by
preparing tables of oomnnents versus EPA respcMise. Using this analysis,
the relative effectiveness of each group's canments was measured and
oonpared. Over 300 pages of statistical output were generated. The
results of the above analysis are discussed in Secticai 5.
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Representative Group Response
Once the 2601 comments had been analyzed, selected oornnenters
representing the groins participating in the NESHAP were telephoned and
given the opportunity to ccrtment on the preliminary results. TJiese
groups represented both sides of each issue, including viewpoints fran
EPA, industry, envircaimental groups and local government officials
involved in the cotnnent process. Ihe telephcxie survey was performed
for two reascxis; it checked the validity of the findings determined in
the statistical analysis, and it helped to provide some of the
explanations for the results obtained.
Representatives from many of the groups submitting oonments were
also asked for their opinicai on the methods used and the applicability
of the statistical analysis procedures. All representatives were
contacted via telephaie for discussicxi of the draft results, and sane
filled out questionnaires or agreed to personal meetings to review the
draft results in detail.
Individuals contacted are listed in Table 4.6. The results of
their informal canments are presented in Section 5.
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OSable 4.6 PEER REVIEW OF CRAFT RESULTS RKM THIS STUDY
NAME POSITICN GROUP   FHCNED QUESOMR MEETIN3
R. Ajax
R. Drake
Standards Development  EPA
Branch, USEPA
President, Glass    Glass Mfg
Packaging Institute
D. Doniger   Senior Staff Atty   Envr Grps
NRDC
B. Early Legislative Rep.
Sierra Club
Envr Grps
G. Fitzsiratrons Standards Develcpnent     EPA
Branch, USEPA
C. Frantz Envir Control
CXrens-111 inoi s
M. Gregory        Arizona Chapter
Sierra Club
L. Lindquist     Plant Manager
ASARCO, Inc.
J. Nolan Envr Engineer
Puget-Sound APCA
P. Scanlon   Plant Manager
Phelps-Dodge Corp.









SBCnCN V - RESULTS
The results of the statistical analysis of the ooranents submitted
were not surprising to many of the participants v*io reviewed the
preliminary data. 'Hhey do, however, provide many clues v*iich can be
lased to characterize and explain the effects that public comment can
have in the environmental regulation process. These effects are
evaluated 1^ characterizing the coninents presented to EPA and analyzing
the i^ency's response. . «
Number of Ccnments
The number of comments submitted by each special interest groip       *
provides a sinple, yet interesting insight into the nature of the
public response received by the Agency during the promulgation of the
arsenic standard. Figure 5.1 depicts the proportion of ooranents
submitted by outside groups, displayed for all comments together and
broken apart by risk assessnent and technical issues. These charts
show the relative percentages of comments submitted by each group
involved in the public comment process.
Figure 5.1 indicates that the largest number of comnents submitted
to EPA were by private citizens. The arsenic standard would affect a
large populatioi of workers and citizens living in or around major
arsenic emissicais sources, most notably the Taooma, WA ASARCD copper
















































• FIGURE 5.1    GROUPS PARTICIPATING IN THE ARSENIC STANDARD
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Because of the urban locatic« of these plants, the copper smelter
in particular, a large number of cannents from affected citizens were
expected. However, the number of citizen cotiments may be
disproportionately large due to the inclusion of various people v^o are
actually members of an organized groxxp in another category. This type
of misclassificaticxi error is possible because the determinaticai of
each cotrmenter's identity was based solely on the amount of information
given in a letter submitted to the Agency.
The small proportion of citizen comments c»i technical issues vAien
oonpared to the prcporticai submitted for risk issues should be noted
(11 percent to 51 percent). This is not surprising in light of the
issues dealt with in the technical documents which included data and
engineering problats. The average citizen, though affected by these
issues, is usually not c^>able of presenting a serious argument in this
realm. Consequently, the inpact of citizens in the public involvement
process is most effective in issues v^ich are more understandable.
Citizens are most comfortable with the risk issues which include the
determination of acceptable risk, decisiais concerning jobs versus
health, and the calculation of anple margins of safety. Table 4.1
lists these issues.
Although it is not discernible frcm the charts, nearly 90 percent
of the comments submitted concerned risk assessment issues. This is a
direct result of the Agency's efforts to solicit informaticai from
private citizens on risk assessment issues.
Unlike private citizens, industry appeared to have concentrated
its resources and comments on the technical issues rather than the risk
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issues. Patrick Scanlcxi of Hielps-Dodge Corporation, a major copper
snelting conpany, submitted a number of comments to EPA v*iich related
to the standard. He verified that industry aimed its resources at the
technical issues. He explained industry's philosophy for submitting
comments to the Agency under the section 112 standard:
"Industry realized that EPA would find it difficult to
ignore valid changes based on fact. Risk assessment
involves greater subjectivity than technical issues
and meaningful changes by EPA are unlikely unless the
technical data base indicates it." (Scanlon, 1986)
It was not possible to identify the source of any of the comments
raised at the public hearings. Public hearing conments were submitted
to EPA orally and recorded by the Agency without identification of the
ocxtment's author. Therefore, the comments submitted during these
hearings were analyzed as a single group. This provides an indicaticxi
of the relationship of the public hearing conments to all the other
comments submitted by letter.
Measuring Group Support for the Standard
Comments were separated by: 1) those which indicated support for
the proposed standard, and 2) those vAiidi opposed the standard because
it was either too restrictive or not strict enough. By catparing the
totals of these two comnent types within each group, the relative
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support for the proposed standard can be measured. Table 5.1 shows the
relative support for the standard as indicated by the comments
submitted fran the various groups. In Table 5.1, any comments v^cii
requested a change are cotpared to connents v*iich supported the
regulaticxi.
The most significant feature of this table is that caily one group,
the Medical coimiunity, supported the proposed standard with a majority
of their canments. Nearly all groups participating in the public
oomnent process seemed displeased with the proposed rule, especially
the Environmental groups, the Copper Smelters, and the Glass
Manufacturers. Tvo factors are responsible for this observaticai: group
motivatioi, and political "posturing".













Medical 17 30 57%
University 16 41 39%
Unaffected Industry 7 21 33%
Hearings 209 641 33%
Citizens 373 1240 30%
Businesses 22 85 26%
Goverrment 27 144 19%
Smelters 37 245 15%
Envircximental 12 117 10%
Glass Plants 3 37 8%
Unknown 0 6 0%
lUi'ALS: 723 2601 28%
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The seventy tvgo percent (72%) rate of critical oocntnents revealed
posturing by polarized groups. "Posturing" describes a technique used
by groi^e to achieve ideological goals more effectively. By
exaggerating their discontent with the proposed standard, groups not
coTpletely satisfied with the rule can establish a clear record for
future litigation. Ihe groups which use this method most often are the
same groups v*iich attenpt to shape enviramental reg\ilation most
frequently. In the arsenic standard ccxitroversy, these groups were the
affected industries and the environmental organizaticxis (Fitzsimmons,
1986).
The second explanation for dissatisfaction with the proposed rule
related to motivation for the public participaticxi process. As with
all issues affecting the public, a number of citizen activists get
involved, v*iile a large number of oonplacent individuals do not get
involved. The carplacent "silent majority" is less motivated to voice
their cpinion. Their opinion is presumed to be more si;5)portive of
EPA's actiais, or at least less opposed to it. Unlike the posturing
factor which is used more often by ideologically polarized groi;5)s, the
silent majority factor affects groips with a wider range of opinion,
like citizens.
When these factors are considered together, the level of
satisfaction shown in Table 5.1 most likely underestimates actual
public si^iport for the proposed standard. However, the relative order




Comments were separated by those supportive of the proposed
standard, those requesting that the standard be relaxed, and those
suggesting that the standard was not strict enough. A point systan was
used to evaluate each comment in order to determine the average
"intent" of eadi group. The point syston used was as follows:
+ 10 Points ....... Proposed Standard is not strict enough
0 Points ....... Proposed Standard is acceptable
- 10 Points.......Proposed Standard is too strict
*   Although this system seems trivial, the corments were easily
scored. No individual group obtained a perfect score.  For exanple,
the affected industries disagreed with EPA on nearly all issues, but
sided with the agency on a few—usually those issues in v^ich the
environmentalists strongly differed with the Agency.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3, and Figure 5.2 measure the intent obtained by
averaging all ocmraents submitted by each grotp and subgroup. Figure
5.2 illustrates the averaged intent of the major groups used to
categorize canments submitted for the arsenic standard. As expected,
the Affected Industry group fell towards the bottom of the scale (-10).
This indicated that industry felt the standard was too strict. On the
other side of the ^)ectrum, the Bivironmental Groups category, with an
average intent score of 7.3, indicated that the proposed standard was
ineffective in the protection of public health.
The average comment from other groups such as College/Universities












































FIGURE 5.2   "INTENT" OF GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE ARSENIC STANDARD
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standard although they leaned towards the opinion that the standard was
not strict enough. Ihe Other Industry category (industry v*iich was not
directly affected by the standard—local businesses, cotton industry,
and the Chemical Manufacturer's Association) sided with the affected
industry's viewpoint, although to a lesser degree. The same was true
for Government, vAiich sided with the envircaimentalists, but to a lesser
degree.
' Analysis of the Public Hearing category indicates siqpport for the
proposed regiilation. Ihis is a result of the averaging of caiflicting
views presented at the hearings, rather than an indicatioi of specific
support for the standard. It should be noted that the positions of
each of the groups on the scale of envircximental ideologies were
similar to what would be expected, a fact v*iich supports the analytic
methods used in this study (Ajax, 1986).
Table 5.2 presents the average group and subgroup intent, as well
as the number of comments subnitted by each. Of particular interest in
this table is the variation in tte average intent between subgroi5)s
within the same group. All of the envircximental subgroup scores
indicated that the proposed standard was not strict enough but the
degree of discontent varied widely between individual groups. The
environmental group intent ranged from 2.1 for the Other Groups
category, to a score of 9.1 for the Sierra Club's two participating
chapters. The same is true for the glass manufacturers and the copper
smelters, except that the average intent for all groups in these
categories indicates that the standard was too strict.
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Citizens (C) 1240 -1.1 Groups (G) 1 10.0
Individuals (I) 1204 -1.1
Onion (U) 35 -1.1
Eiivirortnental
Groups (E)








Snelters (S) 245           -7.7       Kennecott (K) 22 -10.0
Rielps-Dodge (P) 42 -10.0
ASfiROO (A) 177 -6.9
Newmont Mining (N) 2 -5.0
TO Chanical (T) 2 0.0
Glass Mfg (L) 31 -8.7 Corning (C) 18 -8.9
CX^ens-Illinois (0) 7 -8.6
Miscellaneous (M) 6 -6.7
Other Industry (I) 21 -4.7 Groups (G) 21 -4.7
Cotton (C) 0









Representatives (R) 26 4.4
Businesses (B) 85 4.9 - ncxie - 85 -4.9
Medical (M) 30 1.1 - ncxie - 30 1.1
Iftiiversity (U) 41 3.3 - none - 41 3.3






Unidentified 6 -5.0 - ncxie - 6 -5.0
TOTftIS: 2601 -1.0 2601 1.0
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An interesting feature of the public coinment oones to light from
an analysis of the trends indicated by these groips. It appears that
as the ideologically extrare groups were less directly affected by the
arsenic standard, the average intent of the oomnents submitted became
generally more suj^ortive of the Agency's proposed standard. Ihis is
not surprising, given the fact that the more affected groups have more
at stake in the standard, both economically (in the case of industry),
and politically (in the case of enviromental groups).
However, this feature could also be tied to less scrupulous
eccxicmic factors as well. In the proposed standard, ncaie of the glass
plants r^resented by the Miscellaneous category were considered for
regulaticMi. These smaller plants would actually benefit eoononically
by the iitposition of a costly regulatioi on their large ooitpetitors.
Consequently, the smaller plants not affected by the proposed standard
argued less vehanently against it.
The same trend is observed with the smelters, as cxie unaffected
smelter actually indicated suf^rt for the proposed standard
(Tennessee Chemical Corporation - only 2 contents submitted). However,
cne must also realize that the smaller facilities also lack the large
amounts of resources necessary to collect their own data and argue
against a proposed standard. This factor would also contribute to the
observed trend.
The subgroups in the government category show an interesting
trend. From Table 5.2, it appears that as government subgroups became
further ranoved from the source of arsenic enissions, they became less
supportive of the proposed standard (National Government = 3.9, State
Government = 3.6, Local Government = 3.1).
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The reason for this may have been the urgency of the arsenic
emissicxis situation. Local governments were eager to have sanething
done about the anissions problem even if the proposed regulatic»i was
thought to be ineffective. The Local government subcategory showed
more si;5^X3rt for the standard than any other government subgrovjp.
State goverrments, v4io had recognized the emissions problem and
had tried in vain to solve than, realized that EPA's efforts were
"nothing new" and ooirmented accordingly (Nolan,1986). Agencies at the
natioial level felt even more strongly that the prcposed standard would
not be effective in reducing anissions, especially when compared to
other anissicxis standards pranulgated by EPA. These agencies were most
opposed to the standard ai the grounds that it was not strict enough.
However, localized suppDrt of the prcposed standard was slight and any
inferences stated are highly subjective since the range of different
intents in the Goverrment category is less than 4 percent of the entire
scale.
Table 5.3 lists, in numeric order, the average intent for each
subgroup. This table highlic^ts a sharp difference in subgroups of the
public hearings. From Table 5.3, it appears as if the participants in
the Taooroa public hearing were significantly more supportive of the
prcposed standard than were the participants in the Washingtcai D.C.
hearing.
Discussions with I»DC Senior Staff Attorney David Doniger verified
this outcome (Doniger, 1986). Two factors can account for the
difference in support for the prcposed standard at the hearings. In
Tacoma, the Agency went to great lengths to involve different affected
groups, especially citizens v*io worked at the smelter and other Taocwa
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Table 5.3    RAMCING CF SUBGROUPS BY AVERAGE INTENT OF OCMffiNTS
(Groups Submitting more than 5 Coranents)





Eiivr Groups (E) Sierra Club (S) 29 9.1
Eiivr Grov5)S (E) NRDC (N) 59 8.4
Ehvr Groins (E) Greenpeace (G) 8 7.5
Government (G) Representatives (R) 26 4.4
Government (G) National (N) 38 3.9
Government (G) State (S) 29 3.6
University (U) - noie - 41 3.3
Government (G) Local (L) 51 3.1
Eiivr Groi^JS (E) Other (0) 21 2.1
Medical (M) - none - 30 1.1
Hearings (H) Taootna, WA (T) 566 0.2
Citizens (C) union (U) 35 -1.1
Citizens (C) Individuals (I) 1204 -1.1
Other Industry (I) Groups (G) 21 -4.7
Hearings (H) Washington, DC (W) 75 -4.9
Businesses (B) - none - 85 -4.9
Glass Mfg (L) Miscellaneous (M) 6 -6.7
Smelters (S) ASARCO (A) 177 -6.9
Glass Mfg (L) Owens-Illirvois (0) 7 -8.6
Glass Mfg (L) Corning (C) 18 -8.9
Shvelters (S) Kennecott (K) 22 -10.0
Smelters (S) Rielps-Dodge (P) 42 -10.0
TOTAIfi: 2590
(Unidentified or Groips with 5 or less Conments)
-1.0





Citizens (C) Groups (G) 1 10.0
Smelters (S) TO Chenical (T) 2 0.0
anelters (S) Newmcwit Mining (N) 2 -5.0
thidentified - none - 6 -5.0
TOOJAIS: 11 -2.7
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area citizens most affected by the enissions. This resulted in the
expressicMi of many different opinicxis at the hearings. Both sides of
the regulatory issues were well represented. Because of the diversity
of viewpoints, the average intent at the Tacatia hearings indicated a
strong sufport for the proposed standard, even though nearly 70 percent
of the conments submitted at the hearing were not supportive of the
rule.
This was not the case at the WashingtCHi D.C. hearing v*iich was
much less publicized and generally daninated by the industry's
viewpoint. In many ways, the Washington D.C. hearing was a typical
public hearing. Regulated industries commonly constitute 90 percent of
<
the presentaticxis in federal agency hearings and catimit as much as 100
times the budget resources of citizen organizations (Checkcway, 1981).
Measuring Group Effectiveness
The catirients were analyzed for their effectiveness in protrpting
EPA to change its initial positicai. "Effectiveness" was measured by
the ratio of the number of comments submitted versus the number of
changes v^ich occurred as a result of the comments. Although over 2600
oomments were submitted on the standards, a lesser number of ccmments
(1642, or 64 percent) requested a change in the proposed regulation.
Oily those ccmments v*iich requested a change were considered in the
analysis of effectiveness. Comments were also broken down into risk
issues and the technical issues to examine whether the Agency responded
deferentially to questions submitted on separate issues of the
regulatioi.
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Table 5.4 presents the effectiveness of various ccranents <xi the
risk assessment/risk managanent process used in pranulgating the
standard. For a list of the specific issues covered, see Table 4.1.
Ihe most significant feature of Table 5.4 is that no single group was
itore than 5 percent successful in convincing EPA to change the proposed
standard. The low effectiveness measured is especially iirportant v*ien
considering that canments on the risk assessment caistituted nearly 90
percent of all cotments submitted to the Agency on the arsenic
standard. When all groups are coisidered together, oily 1 out of every
57 ccranents sent to the Agency ccxioerning the risk assessment process
convinced EPA to change its positioi.
One explanaticMi for the poor success rate of ooranenters lies in
the nature of the risk assessment process. The methods used in risk
assessment involve extensive use of mathematical models based v;pc«








Shielters 109 5 5%
Envr Groups 66 3 5%
Iftiiversity 22 1 5%
Government 81 2 2%
Business 49 1 2%
Ifearings 357 7 2%
Citizens 773 7 1%
Other Industry 7 0 0%
ffedical 11 0 0%
Glass Plants 0 0
TOTALS: 1475 26 2%
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tpon siitplifying assunptions. This produces a situaticai "ripe for
conflict" (Bacow, 1985). A large number of citizens attended EPA
workshops and were ejqiosed to the often-disturbing degree of
uncertainty inherent in the risk assessment process. The number of
ocmnents submitted to the Agency from citizens, 51 E)eroent of all risk
comments, could be attributed to these risk assessment educaticxi
efforts. Citizens found it easy to criticize the Agency's risk
assessment because of their knowledge and interest. (Fitzsimnons, 1986;
Nolan, 1986).
EPA found its risk assessment as easy to defend as it was for
citizens to criticize. Then-administrator Ruckelshaus, ocramenting on
this issue, quipped, "with all its uncertainties, risk assessment data
is like the captured spy...if you torture it long enough, it will tell
you anything you want to know." (Ruckelshaus, 1984). Because of the
many uncertainties, EPA could easily justify its estimation of risk to
the public, since any other approach would include the same magnitude
of uncertainty.
Caments v*iich addressed technical issues raised during the public
comment process are listed by group in Table 5.5. For a list of the
specific issues covered, see Table 4.2. As can be seen in Table 5.5,
the percent of comments v*iich resulted in a change in technical issues
is much larger than those v*iich addressed the risk-related issues.
Comments submitted on the selection of best available control
tedinology, arsenic emissicxis data, or cost estimates had a 20 times
better chance of pronpting EPA to ciiange their position than canments
on risk assessment issues.
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Uiiversity 1 1 100%
Citizens 15 12 80%
Hearings 21 14 67%
Government 23 9 39%
Smelters 56 21 38%
Glass Plants 28 10 36%
Envr Groups 26 3 12%
Other Industry 3 0 0%
tfriknown 4 0 0%
Medical 0 0
Business 0 0
TOTALS: 177 70 40%
The most effective of all groi5)s were the University Academicians.
This group was 100 percent effective in convincing the Agency to change
their proposed standard. However, this is a trivial observatioi since
the University Academicians submitted only one conment relating to the
regulaticxi's technical issues. Therefore, this percentage is not
considered significant and is most assuredly an overestimaticxi of the
group's effectiveness.
It is not easy to explain the extreme effectiveness of citizens
submitting carments oi technical issues (80% as indicated by
Table 5.5). The most reascxiable explanation for this anomaly is that
some individuals identified themselves by name only v*ien submitting
comments. These "citizens" may have actually been members of groups
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with significantly nore experience and expertise on these issues
(Ajax, 1986).
Another possibility is that sane citizens may have been credited
with causing a change v*ien the actual comment made was generated by
somecxie else with a good knowledge of engineering. This scenario is
plausible since certain coranents were submitted "en masse", with a
large number of conroenters signing the same request for a change in the
proposed standard.
Public hearings proved to be effective forums for introducing
changes of a technical nature. The 67 percent effectiveness of
oocnmenters at public hearings is twice as large as that for oonments
submitted by letter. Most of the changes that came about as a result
of the hearings were changes which weakened the standard, and were
submitted during the industry-dominated Washington D.C. hearing. Of
the 14 canments from public hearings which resulted in changes in the
proposed standard, 9 were submitted at the Washington hearings.
The next most effective groups were the affected industries and
government officials. This is due to their direct experience and
expertise with the technical issues surrounding the proposed
regulation. Government groups had tried unsuccessfully to reduce
arsenic emissiois by local or state regulation. In attaipting to solve
the problem, state and local officials became well versed on the
technical issues which the proposed standard addressed.
The state and local agencies, like the Puget-Sound Air Pollution
Control Agency, had up-to-date industry emissions data. Some local
government officials were better educated in these issues than was the
EPA staff (Nolan, 1986). Ohis increased the effectiveness of their
comments on technical issues. The affected industries were most
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familiar with emissicais data and thus controlled the enissions
estimates used by the Agency (Gregory, 1986; Nolan, 1986; Doniger,
1986). The knowledge and oontol of data were the most significant
cause of change to the proposed standard.
Envircaimental grovps were less effective in convincing EPA to
change its position cxi technical issues. Ihis is prc*)ably due to the
lack of technical expertise by these groups vAiich are staffed mostly by
lawyers. Environmental groups, although well aware of the technical
issues, had little ccxitrol over anissicsis data and cost estimates used
by the Agency. The lade of control over the data reduced the ability
environmental groups to convince EPA to change technical issues in the
standard.
Other groups, further removed from the data and technical
experience, were not effective in swaying the Agency on technical
issues. These groups included business groups, unaffected industries,
and the medical community.
Table 5.6 presents a ranking of the effectiveness of various
groups on both technical and risk issues. The most successful of these
groups was the glass manufacturing industry, which caused a change with
1 out of 3 comments subnitted. The high effectiveness of glass
manufacturers can be attributed to their high rate of success oi
technical issues ccmbined with the fact that they did not ccranent cai
risk assessment issues.
The primary copper smelting industry was also relatively
successful in pranoting changes cxi both risk and technical issues.
Environmental groups, government officials and university academicians
were more effective than average, while medical professicxials and
citizens were ineffective in swaying EPA.
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Glass Plants 28 10 36%
Smelters 165 26 16%
Governnent 104 11 11%
University 23 2 9%
Envr Groups 92 6 7%
Hearings 378 21 6%
Citizens 788 19 2%
Business 49 1 2%
Other Industry 10 0 0%
Medical 11 0 0%
Unknown 4 0 0%
TOTALS: 1652 96 6%
From Table 5.6, it is clear that the affected industries, as a
group, were significantly nore effective in pratpting P^ency change
than was any other group. Again, the reascai for much of this disparity
was the fact that EPA was largely reliant upon industry for the data
used as a basis for the regulaticai of arsenic as a hazardous air
pollutant.
Measuring Intent Versus Effectiveness
The final analysis of the comment data involved the separation of
the grouped comments into to categories, those requesting a weaker
standard and those wanting a strcxiger standard. The effectiveness
measure enplqyed in the previous sectiai was then applied to each type
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of conment in order to determine vrfiether EPA was more likely to respcxid
to ccranents of one type or another. This produced a measure of
effectiveness v*iich is dependent upon the intent of the ooratient
sutmitted and independent of the source of the coiment. The tendency
of the Agency to respond to cxie type of conment was then measured as
the ratio of the effectiveness of oorannents requesting a weaker standard
versus tte effectiveness of oonments requesting a stronger standard.
Table 5.7 displays the results of this analysis.
The first two categories. Environmental Groins and the Affected
Industry are not well suited for this analysis since they were
effective in promoting change in only one direction. Ihat is, the
affected industry did not submit any comments v*iich resulted in a
stronger standard, nor did envircximental groi^js prortpt the Agency to
relax the standard.
Environmental groips and affected iirlustries were included in
Table 5.7 to indicate a rather surprising result. Both of these groups
actually did submit oonments which, if ccaisidered seriously by EPA,
vrould have resulted in ideologically opposite changes in the proposed
standard. These ccmments are the 8 "weaker" ccmnents submitted by the
environmental groups and the 7 "stronger" oarments submitted by the
affected industries. Ohe category for each of these comments was the
risk assessment. One industry representative admitted that the
industry did ccranent in the same direction as environmentalists, but
cxily to "set the record straight" (Scanlon, 1986). One environmental
official, on the other hand, denied making contents vAiich would have
made the standard weaker (Doniger, 1986).
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Weaker 15 443 3%
2.7 2%




































Weaker 16 183 8%
2.9 6%
















Weaker 2 61 3%
1.1 3%
Stronger 33 1 3%
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Table 5.7 is most useful for assessing group ooimients vMch caused
changes on both sides of the issues. Biese groups include Citizens,
Government, Hearings, Medical, University, Other Industry, and
Business. The latter four were oonbined into a miscellaneous category
due since they were rather ineffective in causing any changes in the
standard. The citizens category lists a "W:S" ratio of 2.7 to 1. This
means that a citizen stood a three times better chance of prcmoting
changes in the proposed standard if the intent of the canment was to
weaken the standard. This statistic is affected significantly by the
"so-called citizens" who procrpted the Agency to make changes in the
standard on the basis of technical data.
The governnent category shows a nearly two-fold increase in the
respcxise rate for oonments demanding a less strict standard. Ihe data
in the goverrment category indicate the lone "backfiring" oonment.
According to the public coninent record, a government official requested
a re-analysis of the emissions data fron a specific source. In the
government official's opinion, the Agency's estimate was too lew. EPA
respcMided to the request and found that the emissicxi level projected in
the proposed standard was actually too high. Ihe lower emissiais
estimate was included in the final standard. This change weakened the
standard even though the intent of the comment was to make the standard
more strict.
The hearings group indicates a three-fold increase in the response
rate for questions which requested that the standard be made weaker.
Qhis fact comes through in spite of the nearly equal numbers of
coranents submitted by both sides of the issues. The Others category
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shows a slight tendency by the Agency to respond to oonments requesting
a weaker standard. Ihe ratios generated in the Hearings and the Other
categories are, however, not ina^)endent of the group submitting the
oomnent since various groups are included in each category.
All the ratios listed in Table 5.7 which resulted in changes in
either directiai indicated that oortmenters who requested a weaker
standard were more effective, regardless of the group to which they
belong. This observation leads to the conclusion that even without
considering the influence of different groups cai EPA, the Agency
responded disproportionally to canments requesting a weaker standard.
Table 5.8 shows the relationship between intent and effectiveness
for all oonments. Not surprisingly, the W:S ratio is 2.5. Although
oonbining all groups results in a ratio v*iich is somewhat dependent
ipon the success of each of the groups, this table, along with Table
5.7, shows that EPA was itore inclined to weaken the standard than to
strengthen it.
















Weaker 73 869 8%
2.5 6%
Stronger 1 687 22 3%
T0TAI5: 74 1556 22
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Table 5.9 indicates an even greater inclinaticai of the Agency to
respond to industry's viewpoint. Table 5.9 documents the conments
v*iich were "considered" by the Agency. In this methodology, EPA
"ccxisidered" a cotment \/fhen the Agency acted upon a comment with more
than a written response v*iich appeared in the comment publications.
This included comments that the Agency acted upon, but did not
incorporate into the final standard.
For exanple, the Agency addressed comments concerning the risks of
skin cancer fron arsenic exposure. EPA examined published risk factors
and mortality rates for skin cancer. The Pgency determined that these
values were not significant v*ien cotpared to the risks of lung cancer,
and as a consequence, no changes were made (EPA, 1985). The Agency was,
however, proipted to react to the issues raised by these conments vAiich
indicated that the comments were somewhat effective in pronoting EPA
actioi on an issue.
The results in Table 5.9 show that EPA was much more inclined to
consider a conment if it appeared to make the standard more strict.
EPA considered almost three times as many comments when the oorannenter
attenpted to strengthen the standard. In all fairness to the Agency,
TABLE 5.9 INTENT CF OCNSIIM^ED GQWIENT VERSUS EPA CHA^GE
(All Comments Combined)
Considered,
Comment  Changed But Not   Changed  Percent  Ratio  Overall %
Intent  Weaker  Changed  Stronger  Changed  W;S____Changed
Vteaker 73 5 94%
9.0 33%
Stronger 1 189 22 3%
TOTALS: 74 1556 22
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this indicates EPA's cautiai in promulgating a standard v*iich neglects
a possible public health risk factor. However, aice a caiment was
considered, it was 9 times more likely to be incorporated into the
final standard if it atterrpted to weaken the standard.
Research Methodology
The previous analysis demonstrates that this method can be used to
assess the irput of public comment on regulatory decision-making. The
submitted oonments were broken down into groups, each group's intent
was determined by averaging the intent of all comments submitted by
members of the group and their effectiveness in convincing EPA to
change the proposed standard was measured, ihe results of this
statistical analysis of comments received on the arsenic standard, when
considered together, indicate that the standard was weakened to a
degree not merited by the public comment.
First of all, industry concentrated its efforts and resources in
controlling the emissions and cost data and was significantly itore
successful than other groups in convincing the Agency to change its
proposed position. Secondly, the Agency appeared to have been more apt
to change the proposed regulation v*ien the comment submitted requested
a weaker standard, regardless of the groip which submitted it. Ihe
latter point assumes that all submitted comments had an equal validity
v*iich, of course, is false. The trend in Agency's response to the
comments is nonetheless thought to be disproportional to the public
comments submitted. These factors, along with other results discussed
in this section, will be discussed in the context of a public
participation model in the following secticxi.
SECTION VI - DISCUSSION
A method was devised to characterize the groups participating in
the prcmulgatic*! of the arsenic standard; the intent of these groups;
and the relative effectiveness of each group as measured by the success
of their comments. The arsenic standard was chosen for analysis
because EPA went to great lengths to solicit and use public opinion.
In the analysis of this standard, participating groups were clearly
defined and the intent of eacii grotp was coisidered reascxiable in
relation to their inferred envircxraental ideology.
The measures of effectiveness aiployed in the proposed method
indicated that industry-minded groups were more successful than others
in propnting EPA to ciiange the proposed standard. Upon further
analysis of the results, it ^f^ared that EPA responded inordinately to
the industrial viewpoint that the proposed standard vas too strict.
The Godschalk Exchange Model, ad^ted for use in examining the
regulatory public participation process, was applied in order to assess
the success of the entire public participatioi process as a vA^ole.
Ihis model also pinpoints the areas in v^iich public involvement failed
to serve its intended purpose. '
The Godschalk Exchange Model is well suited for use in this type
of study since it is designed to analyze the impacts of participation
in the regulatory process rather than to assess the success of the
regulaticai in accomplishing agency goals. This model provides for an
analysis of the success of public oonment c«i agency regulaticsi by
breaking the participaticxi process into separate but interrelated
phases of exchange between the goveriment agency and the public.
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The model jxirports to analyze public participation in three
phases; the Opportunity Hiase, the Infornaticxi Phase, and the RespcHise
Hiase. See Figure 2.2 for a grafhic representation of the model. In
order to measure the effectiveness of citizen involvement as a whole,
each pdiase must be analyzed independently. This framework was then
used to assess the utility of public involvanent in the arsenic
standard process based upon the efforts of both EPA and the
participating citizens.
Riase 1 - Opportunity
The arsenic standard provided the public with outstanding
opportunities to exchange views on the inherent issues. Three EPA
sponsored workshops, four days of public hearings, and more than 12
months of public ooirment period provided the public with plenty of
cf^rtunity to get involved in the standard^setting process. The
Agency also held meetings with industry representatives, state and
local government officials and envircximental groups to discuss the
technical data used in the proposed arsenic standard.
Just as inportant to the success of the opportunity phase is the
degree to v^ich the public took advantage of the involvement
0K»rtunities. In the pronulgation of the arsenic standard, the public
was involved in an unprecedented fashicn. An indicator of the success
of this phase was the amount of information exchanged. Over 800
perscxis submitted 2601 cotrents in more than 650 letters sent to EPA.
In ccaitrast, another sectioi 112 regulation, benzene, was briefly
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reviewed which ccxitained, all together, 85 comments sufcmitted from the
public sector (Brostrom, 1986).
In addition to the large nuirber of ocranents from citizens, the
affected industries were also heavily involved. Most environmental
regulatory decision-snaking involves cxily selected representatives of
the entire industry, usually large ccitpanies with a significant
eccncmic stake. In the arsenic standard-setting process, all of the
potentially regulated plants worked with EPA to oome to an acceptable
regulatican (Fitzsiimois, 1986).
To summarize the public participation process in terms of the
opportunities presented for the exchange of information, the process
was an unqualified success. EPA made itself accessible to citizens and
groups on both sides of the issues, and the public took advantage of
cpportunities to become involved in the comment process. Ihis two-
directional flow of participation insured adequate opportunity for
public involvement in the process.
Riase 2 - Information
The opportunities presented during the standard-setting process
are useful only if aoccttpanied by a meaningful exchange of
information. The success of the exchange of information can often be
measured in terms of the quantity of information presented by the
public to the Agency, and from the Agency to the public. Like the
opportunity phase, the informatics piase requires a significant effort
from both the Agency and the affected public in order to be successful.
The quantity of informatiai exchanged was used as an indicator of
the cpportunities for public involvement, and it also provides a direct
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indicaticxi of the adequacy of the information phase. Ihe quantity of
information submitted to the Agency from the public vas exceptionally
large, especially v*ien cai^ared to the information gathered from the
public in other EPA standards (Fitzsimmons, 1986).
Informaticxi must also flow fron EPA to the public if this jAiase is
to be considered a success. This flow of information also includes the
proceedings of the public workshops and hearings. Agency public
hearings have been described by others as less-than-perfect forms of
participatory danocracy. Past uses of Agency-spcaisored public hearings
have ranged from the satisfying oily the legal requiretnents, to siitple
cxie-way i^ency public relaticxis efforts, to methods for diffusing
antagonism from the affected public (Checkoway, 1981). The number of
ocximents submitted at the arsenic hearings indicates that a two-way
flow of information and opinion existed, especially in Tacotia, where
over 600 coiments were made cxi the standard by attendees. This seems
to indicate that the public hearing forum for the information phase was
well designed and well used by both the Agency and the affected public.
Other forms of information, most of whidi were required by law,
flowed from EPA to the public. These included the publicatiai of
information documents v^ich outlined the background of the
environmental problan, the technical body of data needed for the
determination of a solution to the problem, and the determination of
alternatives ccxisidered by EPA. Other published documents included the
arsenic standard risk assessment informatioi document with analyses of
applicable epidaniological and toxicological studies used in the
formulation of the risk value used in the standard.
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The last set of documents published before the regulaticxi was
pronulgated were the documents v^dh included the Agency's official
response to the ooninents submitted during the public catment period of
the standard, this included ooninents on both risk assessment and
technical data. All of these documents were available for public
inspection and critique.
The quantity of information provided by the Agency for the public
indicated a successful information phase. Still/ the quality of this
information mist also be assessed to determine the actual success of
public involvement. The quality of information exchanged is a more
elusive measure and requires the data generated by this study.
Phase 3 - Response
The final phase used to analyze the success of the public canment
process is the response phase. In this phase, opportunity and
information exchanges should result in changes in the proposed
standard. These changes include alterations in the Agency's proposed
regulaticxi due to public participatiai and changes in public support
for the final regulation as a result of the incorporation of public
concerns by EPA.
The changes made to the proposed arsenic rule were significant.
Most of these changes occurred as a result of information exchanged
through Agency-sponsored public participation opportunities. Hiese
changes, considered alone, indicate that the response phase was a
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success for the P^ency and the involved public. However, the fact that
many changes were nede as a result of the submitted cornments does not
guarantee a successful process. The exchange model also requires an
analysis of changes in public opinion as well.
The final standard had a significant iirpact on the opinion of the
public. While the final standard was undeniably weaker than the
proposed standard, industry's opinion of the final standard iitproved
(Lindquist, 1986; Scanlon, 1986). For the same reasons, the level of
satisfacticHi of other groups, including local government agencies and
enviroimental groups, was decreased markedly (Doniger, 1986; Early,
1986; Nolan, 1986; Gregory, 1986). The Natural Resources Ctefense
Council has, in fact, sued the Agency over the outcome of the arsenic
standard (Doniger, 1986).
One reason for the changes v*iich affected the perception of the
standard by the groups involved was EPA's dependence on the industries
it regiilates for the data used in the regulaticxi process. Other
researchers have also realized this dependence. As the ecaicmic stakes
increase, so does the willingness of the industries involved to
intervene in the regulatory process with data and other technical
support (Chedccway, 1981). In the arsenic standard-setting process,
the econcmic stakes of coipliance with the proposed standard were
considerable to an already failing cqg^t  industry. Industry's efforts
to change the proposed standard succeeded and their level of
satisfacticxi with the final standard improved.
The diminished levels of support by other various groves affect
the success of the response phase. Some groups will always be
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adversely affected by dianges in a proposed standard. A large number
of participants were not satisfied with the final standard, as
indicated by the representative opinions and the suit pending against
the Agency (Doniger,1986). The most dis^pointed groups were the
ideological supporters of EPA—the envircximental groi:5>s—who are
usually most critical of Agency decisicxis (Buck, 1981).
Still, at least one representative of these groups, local
government, felt that they had adequate opportunity to make a change in
the standard (Nolan, 1986). The problem, according to many of the
groups involved, was not the public involvement process. The problem
with the final standard was the disproportional Agency response to
concerns voiced by industry (DcMiiger, 1986; Nolan, 1986; Gregory,
1986).
According to the Godschalk Exchange model, the breakdown of the
public participation process occurred not as a result of poor
information or opportunities to exchange opinioi, but in EPA's use of
public comment. An explanation for the causes of this problem extend
beyond the confines of the exchange model.
Summary of the Model Phases
The adjusted Godschalk Exchange Model provided an excellent method
for the analysis of the public participation process for enviraimental
regulation. Using the model and its three phases, the promulgation of
the arsenic standard was a qualified success in terms of the use of
public involvement. Opportunities for involvement were provided by
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EPA. The opportunities provided by the Agency were well used by
concerned citizens and various special interest groups. A significant
amount of information was exchanged between the Agency and the public.
These factors contributed to many iiqportant changes in the standard.
However, many of the participants felt that EPA was overly
syiqpathetic to industry's concerns and the final standard was
considerably less acceptable than the proposed standard. Consequently,
the public response to the Agency indicates that the Agency failed to
act in accordance to the public conments submitted during the
information and cK^ortunity phases.
The response phase is, without a doubt, the most crucial element
of the exchange model. This phase is the "bottom line" v*iere changes
are made to the proposed standard and in public opinion. Many of the
groups involved felt that the proposed arsenic regulation would have
been more effective in protecting the public health than the
promulgated standard. Two explanations are provided to analyze their
dissatisfaction. These explanations include public consensus in
environmental rule-making, and a model which eJ5)lains the Agency's
actions on the basis of group theory.
Consensus Explanation for Agency Response
The first explanaticai for dissatisfaction with the final standard
is based upon the fact that any regulatiai, regardless of its content
will disappoint a number of involved participants. Groups who involve
themselves in the public participatiCTi process are highly divergent in
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ideological goals. Industry and envircranental groips disagree on most
environnnental issues. The adversarial nature of the enviroirnental rule-
nakirvg process nearly guarantees the dis^pDintment of some of the
participants.
Additional factors contribute to a reduced satisfaction with an
environmental standard. The degree of satisfaction with a regulation
changes considerably as citizens become enlightened on the issues.
This satisfaction level usually drops as the Agency and involved groups
publicly uncover assunptions and shortcomings of the regulation. Ohis
is especially true for regulations based upon public risk estimates
v*iich contain a significant amount of uncertainty. As the public
becomes more aware of the issues and the uncertainty in many decisions,
the consensus v*iich may have existed at the time of the proposed rule
breaks down. The EPA's chances for pleasing a majority of the citizen
participants are reduced.
Figure 6.1 shews that the reduction of public sijpport is
inevitable, even without any changes to the proposed standard. The
figure is based ipai a model of public ccaisensus proposed by Creighton
(1980). The figure also indicates that public support for a standard
will decrease even if the i^ency's final regulation still satisfies the
largest possible number of participating grovps. The application of
the consensus model is valid for the arsenic standard, however the
reduced level of satisfaction occurred mostly to groups chi one side of
the issues. A one-sided reductiai in satisfacticai indicates that the
cause of the overall drop in satisfaction was not so much a shift in

















FIGURE 6.1   THE BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC CONSENSUS
The shift in the Agency's perception of public opinion can be
explained.    The consensus model provides a possible explanation for the
dissatisfaction of many groups involved in the standard-setting
process, but cannot explain v^y the drcp in satisfaction level was so
disproportional.
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Group ^eory Explanation for Agency Response
Groijp theory defines a "groi:p" as the essential bridge between the
government and the individual (Dye, 1972). Politics, according to
group theory, is the struggle amcxig many groups to change and influence
public policy. In the arsenic standard, the goal of the special
interest groups was to change the proposed regulation. The task of EPA
was to manage group conflict by 1) providing a forum for the conflict
to take place and 2) balancing the interests of carpeting groips.
In this study, the arsenic standard is analyzed in relaticai to the
groups involved. Hie Godschalk Exchange Model is loosely based tpon
group theory, since the public is perceived as a single group v*iich
affects the P^ency.    The use of group theory to explain Agency response
in light of the public involvarent is a logical choice.
In applying groip theory to the arsenic regulation, the final
standard is defined by the result of the Agency's search for an
equilibrium of carpeting interests. This equilibrium is established by
the influence exerted by various groups involved in the conflict. If
group influence is measured caily by the nurrber and intent of submitted
oorannents on the proposed standard, the equilibrium determined as a
result of the participating groups would be similar to that shown in
Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2 indicates that the equilibrium determined by the
Agency's final rule does not correlate well with the conments
submitted. If EPA changed its rule in response to the coiments




























'IGURE 6.2  EQUILIBRIUM BASED ON NUMBER/INTENT OF COMMENTS
to the proposed regulaticxi. Either the Agency did not make a raticMial
decisioi based on the public's caiment, or the group theory model has
left out certain factors.
External factors oormonly affect Agency decisions. The results
discussed earlier indicated that factors other than the number and the
intent of public comment existed and influenced the Agency's
decisions. Ihose discussed earlier included the technical easiertise of
various group and a working knowledge of the data required for
analysis.
Ttje most iitportant consideration in the analysis of influence is
the ability and willingness of various groi5)s to affect final decisicxis
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h»y EPA after a rule is promulgated by filing a suit. The Agency openly
admits that is is seriously affected by the threat of suit from outside
groups (Ruckelshaus, 1984). Other factors affecting the sphere of
influence include the relaticxiship of the group to the Agency and the
current regulatory climate.
The effect of outside factors on the sfrfiere of influence depicted
in Figure 6.2 is significant. Enviraimental groi5)s and industry, with
a willingness and financial backing to sue EPA, increase their
influence on the Agency. Industry and government groups increase their
influence as a result of their technical expertise and the data v^ich
they possess. The influence of industry and business groups increased
due to the current conservative political climate v*iich exists in the
United States, a fact vAiich frustrates environmental leaders (Gregory,
1986).
Other groups such as citizens and medical and university personnel
are usually not benefited by the more subtle factors which shape
environmental regulation. Their influence is measured only by the
number and the intent of cotments they submit during the public
participation period. These groups can increase their influence only
by supporting groups with the ability to manipulate technical data or
sue the P^ency.
Other factors which have not been mentioned most certainly
influenced Agency decisions. However, additional factors are not
required for this analysis. The factors discussed are consi^red
indicative, rather than comprehensive.
Figure 6.3 is an update of Figure 6.2 which uses influences































the intent of the coranenters. llMs figure may provide insight into the
correct reascaiing behind the Agency's response to the public ccrament
process. The equilibrium chosen by EPA in the final standard
correlates with the updated group influence. Figure 6.3 shows that the
decisicxi made by the Agency can be explained rationally, but only for
reasais other than the public will as indicated by the conments
received.
This scenario is likely a more accurate and realistic depictiai of
the Agency's response to public ooninent. TJie main purpose of the
coranent period was to provide the Agency with knowledge of the general
intent of each of the groups. After the intent for each groi^) was well
established, the Agency acted in accordance to the degree of influence
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mustered by the participating groups, rather than by the substance of
the comments submitted. EPA decision to make alteratiais in the
proposed standard was based more upon these oonpeting forces than the
intent of public ccitment.
SECriCXi VII - REOQMMENDATICNS
The EPA does not analyze the effectiveness or the utility of the
public involvement process. The Agency's use of public coninent has
been criticized by many outside groups. The lack of review in its
standard-setting process is damaging to the credibility of the Agency.
This study presents a method v*iich can be used to analyze public
comment submitted to the EPA for an environmental standard. The stucfy
serves to clearly define groups vAiich participate in the environmental
standard process and the collective intent of these groups. The
results of this study also characterize EPA's response to public
oonment.
It is recamiended that the Agency use this method to analyze the
public comment process. The utility of the analytical methods
presented here is subject to the type of standard proposed. Standards
v*iich involve a large number of comments and deal with a high degree of
uncertainty in the data are most applicable to the proposed methods for
analysis.
The results of this study also uncovered other issues. From the
results of the study, is it recomnnended that the Agency continue to
actively solicit the views of the affected public, especially in areas
where there is no current consensus of scientific knowledge. In the
case of section 112 regulation, this includes issues such as the
determination of acceptable risk, jobs versus health, and regulaticxi in
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the face of uncertainty in health effects. In the prorulgation of the
arsenic standard, the Agency did an excellent job in preparing
OKortunities for the public will to be heard.
It is also recommended that the Agency give great deference to
public hearings vAien the affected public can be present. Hie  results
of this study indicate that public hearings were a model for the entire
public conment process, since most of the outcomes from these hearings
were statistically equivalent to the average outcome of the entire
public comment process. However, the results also indicated a
significant difference between the public hearing held in Taooma and
the industry-dominated hearing held in Washington, D.C. The major
cause of the different "intent" of the hearing was the fact that the
general public—those most affected by the outcome—could not be
present due to the economic hardships incurred. It is recommended that
the i^ency either hold all public hearings in areas where affected
citizens reside, or refer to than by another name, since the affected
public cannot realistically be e^^jected to be present.
When public comment is submitted to EPA, the Agency should
consider the actual content of the conment, rather than allowing
externalities to affect the decisic»i-inaking process. In the case of
the arsenic standards, this would have meant a very slight adjustment
in the final regulation. Instead, the proposed standard was
significantly weakened.
Beyoid the incorporation of industry's "better" data, the EPA
increased proposed cut-off limits and added exenptions which will
affect only 3 arsenic enitting facilities in the country. The Icxie
ͣ ͣ"' ͣf^^^'^^*^v
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affected capger  smelter was already installing the required control
technology and one of the affected glass meoiufacturing plants switched
over to a nonarsenic batch. The new standards, a 6-year nationwide
effort, actually resulted in the installation of a single control
device at c«ie facility. This study shows that based on the ootnments
submitted on the standard, the Agency's acticais were not justified.
^^
REFERENCES
Ajax, Itobert, EPA, Meeting with Brostron, Richard. Noventoer 17, 1986.
Review of Preliminary Results.
Ajax, Robert, and Janet Meyer. "Policy Considerations in the Selection
of Naticaial Qnission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
the Tacona Shelter", USEPA VIesvo.  Undated.
Ajax, Robert, EPA, Review of Preliminary Results. Telecon with
Richard Brostron. November 11, 1986.
Berry, Kent D. "Air Toxics: What is the problem and how do we deal
with it?". Environmental Science and Tedinology, pp. 647-651,
Vol. 20 No. 7, 1986.
Berry, Michael A. "Method for Examining Policy Inplementatioi: A
Study of Decisionmaking for the National Anbient Air Quality
Standards, 1964-1984". Doctoral Ihesis, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC. May 1984.
Brostron, Richard J. "Numbers of Conments Submitted in the Benzene
NESHAP", Unpublished, 1986.
Buck, J. Vincent, and Barbara Stoie. "Citizen Involvanent in Federal
Planning: Myth and Reality", Journal of Applied Behavioral
Sciences ^aecial Issue; Citizen Participatioi in Public Policy,
Vol. 17 No. 4, 1981.
Cannoi, Joseph A. "The Regulatioi of Toxic Air Pollutants: A Critical
Review", Journal of the Air Pollutioi Control Associaticai, Vol. 36
No. 5, Ep. 562-573, May 1986.
Checkoway, Barry. "Bie Politics of Public Hearings", Journal of
Applied Behavioral Sciences Special Issue; Citizen"Participation
in Public Policy, Vol. 17 No. 4, 1981.
Creighton, James. Public Involvement Manual. U.S. Department of
Interior, Water and Power Resources Service, January 1980.
Clean Air Act as Amended, Public Law 95-95, August 7, 1977.
Drake, Robert, Glass Packaging Institute, Review of Preliminary
Results. Telecoi with Richard Brostron. Novanber 5, 1986.
Doniger, David, NRDC, Review of Preliminary Results. Telcc»i with
Richard Brostron. November 10, 1986.
Dye, Thomas. "Models of Politics; Seme Help in Thinking About Public
Policy", In; Understanding Public Policy, Prentiss Hall,
pg. 17-37, 1972
91
Early, Blake, Sierra Club, Review of Preliminary Results. Teleccsi with
Richard Brostron. November 6, 1986.
Bivironment Reporter. "Interagency Group Urges EPA to Weigh Costs,
Benefits of its Air Cancer Policy", p. 2059, February 29, 1980.
Biviroirnent Reporter. "EPA is Giving Final Review to Listing Arsenic
as Air Act Hazardous Pollutant", p. 2217, ;^ril 4, 1980.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Extends Comment Deadline on Airborne
Carcinogens Proposed", p. 2277, i^ril 18, 1980.
Environment Reporter. "Scientists, Industry Dispute Basis For EPA
Proposed Air Carcinogen Policy", p. 2114, May 14, 1980.
Environment Reporter. "Cancer Policy May Not Be 'Conerstone' of EPA
Regulations on Itoxic Pollutants", p. 810, October 17, 1980.
Eiivironnent Reporter. "Reagan Criticizes Clean Air Act, EPA, Announces
New Enviroimental Task Force", p. 811, October 17, 1980.
Environment Reporter. "More EPA Ccxitrol Efforts Necessary on Hazardous
Pollutants, Hearing Told", p. 251, June 19, 1981.
Environment Reporter. "Panel Told Air Polluticxi Causes up to 21
Percent of U.S. Lung Cancers", p. 1026, Decenber 25, 1981.
Environment Reporter. "Quantitative Risk Assessment Unreliable, Poses
Difficulties, EPA Draft Paper Says", p. 846, October 22, 1982.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Air Office Drafts Strategy to Control Toxic
Pollutants Under Air Act Section 112", p 1166, November 26, 1982.
Environment Reporter. "CPRM Comments en the Draft 112 Strategy",
p.1186, November 26, 1982.
Environment Reporter. "Draft Toxic Air Pollutant Strategy", p. 1183,
November 26, 1982.
Environment Reporter. "Fourth Draft of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant
Strategy", p. 1632, January 21, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Ordered to Issue in 180 Days Proposed Rules
for Inorganic Arsenic", p. 1621, January 21, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "0<A Awards Ccxitract for Continuing Study of
Link Between Inorganic Arsenic, Cancer", p. 2356, Pspril  22, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "Etnissicxi Standards for Inorganic Arsenic from
Capper  Snelters, Glassmaking Sought", p. 5, May 6, 1983.
92
Environment Reporter. "EPA Proposes Ccxitrols cai Arsenic Ehiissions,
Seek Comment cai Smelters Posing High Risks", p. 395, July 15,
1983.
Bivironment Reporter. "Proposal to Control Inorganic Arsenic as
Hazardous Air Pollutant Issued by EPA", p. 433, July 22, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Postpones Public Hearings, Extends Canment
Period on Proposed Arsenic Rules", p. 699, August 26, 1983.
Bivirorment Reporter. "Policy Shifts, Uncertainty Over Data Cause
Toxic Rules Delay, GftO Report Says", p. 903, September 23, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "Rudcelshaus Calls for More *Flexibility' in
Regulating Hazardous Air Pollutants", p. 1286, November 11, 1983.
Environment Reporter. "QMS Position Use of Risk Assessment, Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis, Benefit-Cost Review in Setting Standards
for Toxic Air Pollutants", p. 1593, January 13, 1984.
Bivironment Reporter. "Comment Period Reopened for Two Issues Involved
in EPA Inorganic Arsenic Proposal", p. 2191, March 30, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "WashingtOTi Agency Mcpts Rules To Control
Fugitive Arsenic Bnissic8is at ASARCO Plant", p. 20, May 4, 1984.
Enviroitnent Reporter. "Arsenic Standards for Taocxta Smelter Said to be
Tighter than Those Proposed", p. 297, June 22, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "Arsenic Rule Delayed Until Spring: ^3RDC
Threatens Lawsuit To Force Issuance", p. 649, August 17, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "Proposed Regulations on Arsenic Snelters To Be
Combined Into One Rulemaking, EPA Says", p. 692, August 31, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "Revised Estimates of Arsenic Emissions, Costs,
Results in Reopening Comment Peroid", p. 892, October 5, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "Toxic Study Will Show Cancer Rates Caused By
Air Pollution, Canncn Says", p. 373, June 29, 1984.
Environment Reporter. "Tougher and Tougher Decisions Facing EPA as It
Moves Into Late: 1980's, Ihcmas Says", p. 13, May 3, 1985.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Advised Tb Avoid Excess Stringency in
Developing Naticxial Air Toxics Standards", p. 1080, October 25,
1985.
Environment Reporter. "EPA Sets Section 112 Standards to Control
Industrial Bnissicxis of Inorganic Arsenic", p. 395, July 11,
1986.
93
Envirorroent Reporter. "1«DC May Sue Over Cost Benefit Analysis Used By
EPA To Set Arsenic Ehiissiai Limits", p. 410, July 18, 1986.
Bivironment Reporter. "EPA Issues Rule, Background Summary for
Inorganic Arsenic Emission Standards", p. 543, August 8, 1986.
Eagence, Michael. "Citizen Participation in Planning", in Urban and
Regional Planning Series Vol. 19, Pergamtnon Internaticxial Library,
Oxford, England, 1977.
Eainsod, Merle. "Seme Reflections on the Regulatory Process", Public
Policy, eds. Friedrich and Mason, jp. 297-323, 1940.
Federal Register. "NaticHial Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; Standards for Inorganic Arsenic; Final Rule", Vol. 51,
No. 149, August 1986.
Peldman, Steven L. "The Administrative Procedures Acts Notice and
Conment Requiretents: "Good Caxises" for Futher Delay in the
Iitplanentaicxi of the Clean Air Act?", Boston College
Environmental Affair Law Review. Vol. 9 p. 549-622, Summer 1981.
Fitzsimmons, Graham, EPA, Review of Preliminary Results. Meeting with
Richard Brostrom. November 10, 1986.
Godschalk, David, and Bruce Stiftel. "Making Waves, Public
Participation in Water Planning", Journal of Applied Behavioral
Sciences S^)ecial Issue; Citizen Participaticai in Public Policy,
Vol. 17 No. 4, 1981.
Gregory, Michael, Sierra Club, Review of Preliminary Results. Telcon
with Richard Brostron. November 12, 1986.
Jasanoff, Sheila, and Dorothy Nelkin. "Science, Technology and Limits
of Judicial Cotpetence", Science, Vol. 214, p. 11, Decanber 1981.
Kramer, Bruce M. "Economics, Tecimology and Clean Air Amendments of
1970, The First Six Years", Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 6. No. 1,
University of California School of Law, Berkeley, California, pp.
161-245, 1976.
Lake, Laura M. Environmental Regulatiai - The Political Effects of
Inplgnenatiai, Prager Publishers, New York, pp. 1-152, 1982
Lindquist, L.W., ASARDO Inc., Review of Preliminary Results. Teleoon
with Richard Brostrcm. November 13, 1986.
McMahon, Gerald. "Regulatory Negotiaticxi: A Response to the Crisis of
Regulatory Legitimacy", Doctoral Oliesis, Harvard Law School,
Boston, MA. May 1985.
~3^^W^^
94
Potter, J.C., Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation,
"Accelerating the Process for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NfSHAP)".
Memo to Thotias, L., Adtnisistrator. August 15, 1986. p.4.
Nelkin, Dorothy, and Michael Polladc. "Public Participation in
Technical Decisions: Reality or Grand Illusicxi?", Tedinology
Review, Vol. 8 No. 8, pp. 54-64, August/September 1979.
Official Transcript. "Public Hearing on Proposed Standards for
Inorganic Arsenic Qnissions", Cascade R^wrting Co., Seatle, WA.
Vol. I, p.1-375, Novarber 2, 1983.
Official Transcript. "Public Hearing on Proposed Standards for
Inorganic Arsenic Emissions", Cascade Reporting Co., Seatle, WA.
Vol. II, p.1-283, November 3, 1983.
Official Transcript. "Public Hearing on Proposed Standards for
Inorganic Arsenic Emissions", Cascade Reporting Co., Seatle, WA.
Vol. Ill, p.1-74, November 4, 1983.
PederscHi, William. "Formal Records and Informal Ruleraaking", 85 Yale
Law Journal 38, pp. 38-87, 1975.
Nolan, James, Puget-Sound APCA, Review of Preliminary Results.
Questionnaire from Richard Brostrcra. Novanber 26, 1986.
Nolan, James, Puget-Sound APCA, Review of Preliminary Results. Teleoon
with Richard Brostrcm. November 7, 1986.
Rudcelshaus, William. "Science, Risk and Public Policy", Speech Given
to the Naticxial Acadany of Sciences, June 22, 1983.
Ruckelshaus, William. "Risk in a Free Society", Speech Given to
Princeton University Alimnus, February 18, 1984.
Rudcelshaus, William. "Environmental Consensus in This Industrial
Society", Speech Given to the Detriot Economic Club, ;^ril 16,
1984.
Ruckelshaus, William. "Resolving Environmental Disputes", Speech Given
to the Conservatioi Foundation, October 1, 1984.
Scanlon, Patrick, Phelps-Dodge Corp., Review of Preliminary Results.
Questionnaire from Richard Brostron. December 3, 1986.
Scanlon, Patridc, Hielps-Dodge Corp., Review of Preliminary Results.
Teleccxi with Richard Brostrcm. November 13, 1986.
Stewart, Richard. "The Development of Administrative and Quasi-
Ccaistitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental
Decisionmaking: Lessais from the Clean Air Act", 62 Iowa Law
Review, pp.  713-, 1977.
95
Susskind, S. Persioo. "Guide to Ccxisenses Development and Dispute
Resolution Techniques for use in Government Industry Conflicts" r
Doctoral Thesis, Harvard Law School, Bostai MA. October 30, 1983.
Troy. Neal, Owens-Illinois, Review of Preliminary Results. Teleoon
with Richard Brostrcm. Novanber 4, 1986.
U.S. Bureau of Mines. Copper,   U.S. Dept. of Interior, Washingtai,
D.C., 50 p.
U.S. Envircxunental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic Bfnissions from
High-Arsenic Primary Copper Smelters—^Background Information for
Proposed Standards. Research Triangle Park, VC.
EPA-450/3-83-009a. i^ril 1983. 358 p.
U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic NESHAPS;
Response to Public Comments on Health, Risk Assessment, and Risk
Management! Research Triangle Park, NC. EPA-450/5-85-001.
i^ril 1985. 215 p.
U.S. Envircaimental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic Emissions from
*   Primary Qyppet  Smelters and Arsenic Plants—^Background Information
for Prormlgated Standards. Research Triangle Park, NC.
EPA-450/3-83-010b. May 1986. 302 p.
U.S. Enviroiraental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic Risk
Assessment For Primary and Secondary Lead Smelters, Primary Zinc
Smelters, Oxide Plants, Cotton Gins, and Arsenic Chemical Plants.
Research Triangle Park, NC.  EPA-450/5-85-002. i^ril 1985. 90 p.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic from Glass
Manufacturing Plants—^Background Information for Promulgated
Standards"! Research Triangle Park, NC.  EPA-450/3-83-011b.
May 1986. 148 p.
U.S. EnvircHimental Protection Agency. Inorganic Arsenic Ehdssions from
Glass Manufacturing Plants—^Background Information for Proposed
Standards. Research Triangle Park, NC. EPA-450/3-83-011a.
J^ril 1983. 183 p.
U.S. Enviroiraental Protection i^ency. Inorganic Arsenic Bnissions from
Lew-Arsenic Primary Co^^er Smelters—Background Informaticai for
Proposed Standards. Researdi Triangle Park, NC.
EPA-450/3-83-OlOa. ^^ril 1983. 467 p.
U.S. EnvirCHimental Protection Agency. The Air Toxics Problgn in the
United States; An Analysis of Cancer Risks for Selected
Pollutants! Researdi Triangle Park, NC. EPA-450/1-85-001.
May 1985.
96
U.S. Enviraimental Protection Agency. Health Assessement Document for
Inorganic Arsenic. Wahington, D.C^ EPA-600/8-83-021F.
March 1984. pp. 7.141-7.149.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Status of Standards of
Performance; Natioial anission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants, Research Triangle Park, NC. September 16, 1985.
EP. 15-18.
White, Lawrence J. Reforming Regulation: Process and Prcfclgns,
Prentice Hall Inc., Englevgood Cliffs, N.J. pp. 1-240, 1981.
APPESDIX A - Forms used to Solicit Opinion of Draft Results
Response to Public Comment in the Arsenic NESHAP
Over 2600 comments submitted during the notice-and-comment period of the
Arsenic NESHAP were separated into two distinct areas; Risk Assessment/Risk
Management and Technical Issues.  This separation was performed by EPA
contractors in the preparation of the documents presenting the comments on the
standard and the official Agency response to them.  The attached pie-chart
shows the relative percentages of different groups involved in the comment
process.  Over 907o of all the comments submitted were in the Risk-Assessment,
while all (1007o) changes made to the standard were in the Technical Issues.
Please comment on the following ideas:
Risk Assessment Issues, with all their assumptions, were attacked
mostly due to their inherent vulnerability. ^
2.  Citizens are more apt to comment on risk assessment issues since the
technical issues are too difficult and involved for most citizens.
No changes were made to the risk assessment since it is as easy for the
Agency to defend it as it is easy for outside groups to criticize it.
Any other ideas from this figure?


















































Response to Public Comment in the. Arsenic NESHAP
Comments were also separated by those indicating support for the proposed
standard, and those opposed to the standard because it was either too strict
or not strict enough.  The attached table shows the relative support for the
standard as indicated by the various groups which submitted comments to the
Agency.  Please comment on the following ideas:
No group, with the exception of the medical community, was satisfied
with the proposed standard.
Groups not satisfied with the standard were "posturing" (exaggerating
their discontent) for the record in order to establish their positions
for potential litigation.
wny QO you think the "Government" group was nearly as opposed to the
proposed standard as the environmental groups and the affected
industries?  (Puget-Sound APCA was considered in the Local Government
category.)
Any other ideas from this figure?
COMMENTOR'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARSENIC NESHAP
# Comments % Comments
in Support of # Comments in Support of
the Proposed Submitted the Proposed
Group Standard to EPA Standard
Medical Personnel 17 30 577.
Univ Personnel 16 41 397o
Unaffected Industry 7 21 33%
Hearings 209 641 33%
Citizens 373 ͣ'  1240 30%
Businesses 22 85 26%
Government 27 144 19%
Smelters 37 245 15%
Envr Groups 12 117 10%
Glass Plants 3 37 8%
TOTALS: 723 2601 28%
Response to Public Comment in the Arsenic NESHAP
Comments were then separated by those opposed to the proposed standard by
those groups who wanted a stricter standard and those groups who felt the
standard was to strict.  The point system used to evaluate each comment in
order to average the intent of each group of commentors was as follows:
+10 Points        Standard is not strict enough
0 Points        Proposed Standard is acceptable
-10 Points        Standard is too strict
Although this system may be a bit contrived, the comments were quite
easily scored.  No group maintained a perfect score since, for example, the
affected industries disagreed with EPA on nearly all issues, but did agree on
a few (usually those issues where the environmentalist-strongly differed with
EPA).  The attached tables and figure show the "intent" obtained when
averaging all comments submitted by each group and subgroup.  Please comment
on the following ideas.
1.   Were the Tacoma hearings more supportive of the standard than the
Washington DC hearings (see table) or is this simply a result of
averaging?
As the form of government became more localized, comment (on the
average) became more supportive of the proposed standard.
(National Govt = 3.9, State Govt = 3.6, Local Govt = 3.1)
Are the results of this figure something expected? What does this say
about the methods used to average the "intent" of a group?
Any other ideas from these tables or the figure?
INTENT OF COMMENT GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS
Group Name
Citizens (C)
Number of  Group
Comments   Intent
1240
Government   (G)




Individuals   (1)
Groups   (G)











Representatives (R)      26










Envr Groups (e) 117 7.3 NRDC (N) 59 8.4
Sierra Club (S) 29 9.1
Greenpeace (G) 8 7.5
Other (0) 21 2.1
Smelters (S) 245 -7.7 ASARCO (A) 177 -6.9
Kennecott (K) 22 -10.0
Phelps-Dodge (P) 42 -10.0
Newmont Mining (N) 2 -5.0
TN Chemical (T) 2 0.0    -
Glass Mfg (L) 31 -8.7 Corning (C) 18 -8.9
Owens-Illinois (O) 7 -8.6
Miscellaneous (M) 6 -6.7
Othr Indstry (l) 21 -4.7 Groups (G) 21 -4.7





Businesses (B) 85 4.9 56 Businesses 85 -4.9
Medical (M) 30 1.1 - none - 30 1.1




2601 •1.0 2601 -1.0
RANKING OF SUBGROUPS BY INTENT OF COMMENTS
(Groups Submitting 5 or more Comments)
Group Name
Number of SubGroup
Subgroup Name Comments Intent
Sierra Club (S) 29 9.1
NRDC (N) 59 8.4
Greenpeace (G) 8 7.5
Representatives (R) 26 4.4
National (N) 38 3.9
State (S) 29 3.6
- none - 41 3.3
Local (L) 51 3.1
Other (0) 21 2.1
- none - 30 1.1
Tacoma, WA (T) 566 0.2
Union (U) 35 -1.1
Individuals (I) 1204 -1.1
Groups (G) 21 -4.7
Washington, DC (W) 75 -4.9
56 Businesses 85 -4.9
Miscellaneous (M) 6 -6.7
ASARCO (A) 177 -6.9
Owens-Illinois (O) 7 -8.6
Corning (C) 18 -8.9
Kennecott (K) 22 -10.0
























RANKING OF SUBGROUPS BY INTENT OF COMMENTS
(Groups Submitting 5 or less Comments)




























































Response to Public Comment in the^ Arsenic NESHAP
The comments were then analyzed for their effectiveness in prompting the
EPA to change the proposed standard.  This "effectiveness" was measured by the
ratio of the number of comments submitted versus the number of changes
occurring as a result of those comments.  Comments were broken down into "All
Comments Submitted" and "Technical Issues" categories, since comments in the
category "Risk Assessment Issues" did not produce a change.  (EPA did
re-evaluate some aspects of the risk assessment, but no changes were made.)
Please comment on the following ideas.
1.   The groups with the enough financial backing to file suit against the
agency were the most effective in prompting, a change in the standard.
Most of industry's effectiveness resulted from the fact that EPA is
completely reliant upon industry for the data it needs.  (Most of the
changes made were changes in data). *  .
Environmental groups were not very effective in promoting changes in
the regulation because EPA's proposed standard adequately incorporated
their environmentally conservative views.
4.   Any other ideas from this table?



























































Response to Public Comment in the Arsenic NESHAP
The last attached table splits up grouped comment into those wanting a
weaker standard and those wanting a stronger standard. The "effectiveness"
measure used before was then applied to each type of comment in order to
determine if EPA was more likely to respond to one type or the other.  This
produced a measure of effectiveness independent of the source.  Please comment
on the following ideas.
The EPA responded three times more strongly to those commentors
requesting a less strict standard than those wanting a stricter
standard.
Government was more than twice as effective in promoting EPA to change
the proposed standard.'iHi" uis**, ejr^v''YnfMm&vv'"<iA <lraupa.
. 3.   Any other ideas from this table?
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ASARCO-El Paso 27.5 16.7 - 397.
Kennecott-Utah 8 1.5 817o
Kennecott-Hayden 6.5 6.5 07.
Kennecott-McGill 45.9 10.1 787.
Phelps Dodge-Morenci 6.9 1.9 727,
Phelps Dodge-Ajo 2.6 0.5 81%
Phelps Dodge-Hidalgo 1.2 0.2 831
128.7 42.8 677,



















**  Capital Cost Estimates  (EPA-450/3-83-010b pg 1-8-17)
Response to Public Comment in the Arsenic NESHAP
Final summary notes;
1.  Do you feel as if you had a chance to make an impact on the final
standard?  If "yes", do you think you made an impact?
Are you more satisfied with the promulgated-standard as compared to the
proposed standard?
How applicable are these initial findings to other NESHAPS or even
NSPS's that you have been involved with?
4.   Would negotiated rulemaking have made for a more satisfactory
standard?  Does it have a place in a health-based standard?
5.   Would you like a copy of the study?
;--..?^-.-^'5*^'-/'^--
APPEM3IX B - Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
37
(i) seven years after the date on Tv^hich any waiver
is granted to such source or portion thereof, or
(ii) four years after the date on which such source
or portion thereof commences operation,
whichever is earlier.
(F) Xo waiver under tliis subsection shall apply to any
portion of a source other than the portion on which the
innovative technological system or systems of continuous
emission reduction is used.
(2) (A) If a waiver under paragraph (1) is terminated
under clause (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), the Adminis¬
trator shall grant an extension of the requirements of this
section for such source for such minimum period as may
be necessary to comply with the applicable standard of
performance under subsection (b) of this section. Such
period shall not extend beyond the date three j-ears from
the time such waiver is terminated.
(B) An extension granted under this paragraph shall
set forth emission limits and a compliance schedule con¬
taining increments of progress which require compliance
with the applicable standards of performance as expedi-
tiously as practicable and include such measures as are
necessary and practicable in the interim to minimize
emissions. Such schedule shall be treated as a standard of
performance for purposes of subsection (e) of this sec¬
tion and section 113. . ...-•--.
X.VTIOX.^L   EMISSION-   STAXDARDS   TOR   H^VZARDOUS  AIR
POLLtTTAXTS
Sec. 112. (a) For purposes of this section—
(1) The term "hazardous air pollutant" means
an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality
standard is applicable and which in the judgment of
the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pol¬
lution which may reasonably be anticipated to result
in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.
(2) The term "new source" means a stationary
source the construction or modification of which is
commenced after the Administrator proposes regula¬
tions under this section establishing an emission
standard which will be applicable to such source.
(3) The terms "stationary source," "motlification,*'
"owner or operator" and "existing source" shall have
the same meaning as such terms have under section
111(a). .....; .^
(b) (1) (A) The Administrator shall, within 90 days
after the date of enactment of the Clean Air Amend¬
ments of 1970, publish (and shall from time to time
thereafter revise) a list which includes each hazardous air
pollutant for which he intends to establish an emission
standard under this section.
Source: U.S. Government Printing Office (1977)
(Committee Print)
38
(B) Within 180 days after the inclusion of any air pol¬
lutant in snch list, the Administrator shall publish pro¬
posed n-^ulalions establishing cjnlssion standards for
such pollutant together with a notice of a public hearing
within thirty days. Not later than 180 days after such
publication, the Administrator shall prescribe an omis¬
sion standard for such pollutant, milcss he finds, on the
basis of information presented at such hearings, that such
pollutant clearly is not a hiizardous air pollutant. The
Administrator shall establish any such standard at the
level which in his judgment provides ftn ample margin ofsafety to protect ^e public health from such hazardous
air pollutant. • • '
(C) Any emission standard established pursuant to
this section shall become effective upon promulgation. "
(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue
information on pollution control techniques for air pol¬
lutants subject to the provisions of this section. '*• v^i i
(c) (1) After the efi'ective date of any emission stand¬
ard under this section— ͣ ' ͣ • ͣ';        '     •'   ' "i;"':..!
(A) no person may constinct any new source or
modify any existing source wliich, in the Adminis¬
trator's judgment, will emit an air pollutant to which
.such standard applies unless the Administrator finds
that such source if properly operated will npt cause
emissions in violation of such standard, and  '" ͣ ' ''' ͣ ''
(B) no air pollutant to which such standard ap¬
plies may be emitted from any stationaiy source in
violation of such standard, except that in the case of
an existing source—
(i) such standard shall not ajDply until 90
days after its effective date, and
(ii) the Administrator may grant a waiver
permitting such source a period of up to two
years after the effective date of a standard to
comply with the standard, if he finds that such
])eriod is necessary for the installation of con¬
trols and that steps will bo taken during the
period of the waiver to assure that the health
of pereons will be protected from imminent
endangei-ment.     ͣ- ͣ
(2) The President may exempt any stationary source
from compliance with paragraph (1) for a period of not
inorc than two years if he finds that the technology to
implement such standards is not available and the oper¬
ation of such source is required for reasons of national
security. An exemption under this paragraph may be ex¬
tended for one or more.additional periods, each period
not to exceed two years. The President .shall make a re-
])ort to (^ongrcss with respect to each exemption (or ex¬
tension thereof) made under thi.s iwragraph.
Source:  U.S. Government Printing Office (1977)
(Committee Print)
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(d)(1) Each State may develop and submit to (he
AdiuiiiiKtrator a proccdnio for iii)i)k'nic!itinn and cnforc-
iufT emission standards for hazardous air |)()llutantH for
stationary sources located in such State. If the Adminis¬
trator finds the State procedure is adequate, he shall dele¬
gate to such State any authority lie has under this Act to
implement and enforce such standards.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Ad¬
ministrator from enforcing any applicable emission
standard under this section.    ;     •   ..    ,
(e) (1) For purposes of this section, if in the judgment
of the Administrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or en¬
force ail emission standard for control of a liazanlous air
pollutant or pollutants, he may instead promulgate a de¬
sign, equipment, work iiiactice, or operational standard,
or combination thereof, which in his judgment is ade¬
quate to protect the public health from such pollutant or
pollutants with an ample margin of safety. In the event
the Administrator promulgates a desi^rn or equipment
standard under this subsection, he shall include as part of
such standard such requirements as will assure the proper
operation and maintenance of any such element of design
or equipment,. ͣ . . .     • ͣ   ͣ   .   ͣ. .
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase "not
feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard"
means any situation in which the Administrator deter¬
mines that (A) a hazardous pollutant or pollutants can¬
not bo emitted thixmgh a conveyance designed and
constructed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that
any requirement for, or use of, such a conveyance would
be inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local law, or
(B) the application of measurement methodology to a
particular class of sources is not practicable due to tech¬
nological or economic limitations.
(3) If after notice and opjwrtunity ipr public hearing,
any pei-son establishes to the satisfaction of the Adminis¬
trator that an alternative means of emission limitation
will achieve a reduction in emissions of any air pollutant
at least eiiuivalont to the reduction in emissions of such
air pollutant achieved under the i-equirements of para¬
graph (1), the Administrator shall permit the u.se of such
alternative by the source for jiurposcs of compliance with
this section with i-espect to such pollutant.      ,   •
(4) Any standard promulgated under paragraph (1)
shall be promulgated in terms of an emission standard
whenever it becomes feasible to i^romulgate and enforce
such standard in such terms.
KKDKKAL   KNFOIICKJIENT
Skc. ll.'l. (a) (1) Wiienever, on the basis of any infor¬
mal ion a vailiiiilc. (o him, (he Adminisdalor linds that any
person is in violation of any leiiuircmcnt of an applicable
Source:  U.S. Government Printing Office (1977)
(CoiDmittee Print)
